Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

The ZEC aims to acquire rights to manage and use other resources including wildlife and minerals. They have
requested more information on WMAs to assess the costs and benefits of creating one. According to them,
27 large species of animals live in the Suledo forest. They also have formed groups for bee keeping, but to
date they have not been able to effectively market their products.
Two major problems were highlighted by the ZEC that could limit these new sources of revenue:
� Neighboring villages still see Suledo forest as idle land and, as a result, villages are having trouble slowing
incursions, including farmers who want to cut down the Suledo forest for agricultural purposes; and
� Wildlife poachers and illegal timber harvesting occurs and the ZEC has limited capacity to combat these
drivers.
According to the ZEC, bushfires used to be a problem. They are not a problem anymore, as villagers have
reduced biomass–and therefore fires–by allowing pasture to be created within the forest.
3.4.3 FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE INSTITUTION
Designation of beneficiaries and design of benefit-sharing rules:
In Suledo, the ZEC proposed a system for distributing benefits earned from harvesting with approval of the
VECs. The rule used in 2010 was that all 10 villages received an equal share, regardless of how much a
village‘s land has contributed to Suledo Forest or how much of the village‘s land in the forest has been
harvested.
Decisions on how to use the money within each village were made by the VECs or by the Village Council.
According to the ZEC, village priorities are read to Village Assemblies so everyone knows how the money is
to be spent. VECs or VCs have also told the ZEC how they will spend money. In 2010, the money was used
for community projects and not handed to households. As an illustration, Lengatei village used its $600 US (1
million TZS) to renovate a house for two teachers (it is difficult to retain teachers in this part of Tanzania). In
this case, the Village Council made the decision on how to spend the money but it was passed by the Village
Assembly.
Delivery of benefits:
The following process was described in interviews with the ZEC and with village government. The ZEC
collects all harvesting revenue and some fees (as mentioned above) and ZEC operating costs are taken off the
total revenue. Of the remaining funds, 10 percent was given to the District (this is not required by law but the
ZEC decided to do so) and 90 percent to villages. The ZEC mentioned that they are happy with the District
Forestry Officer. One District Forestry Officer is now based in Suledo to help with harvesting decisions and
to contract negotiations. Initially, guards were paid by the facilitation agency but now the ZEC covers their
salaries in addition to the transport and sitting fees of VEC members who come to ZEC meetings. The ZEC
gave the money to villages by depositing it into the Village Council bank account. The ZEC has an auditing
committee and if villages do not spend the money appropriately it can take legal action. No mismanagement
problems were reported in 2010.
However, in 2010, ZEC operating or overhead costs amounted to more than 50 percent of what was
collected as harvesting revenues. The District Forest Officer explained that the ZEC had hired the brother of
a Member of Parliament to be the manager and paid him $300 US (500,000 TZS) per month and gave him
benefits such as a vehicle, health insurance, as well as a $50 US (100,000 TZS) monthly operating budget. The
brother had, however, no experience managing a community forest and Suledo ended up receiving a much
smaller payment than anticipated from the harvesting contract. It was not clear if this situation was due to
some form of corruption within the ZEC. The District Forest Officer, as well as other experts interviewed,
believed this situation was simply the result of a bad decision. Villagers interviewed said that they plan to
watch the harvesting issue more closely next year.
60 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER