Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

constitution creates an additional cause for uncertainty. The general expectation of greater decentralization of
responsibilities to local government has already driven the central government to propose several new
national parks. 136
Private sector:
All forest lands in Nepal were nationalized in 1957. The extent and status of forests that currently exist on
privately owned lands is not well understood or actively supported by the government. Within the national
forest, private individuals, cooperatives, and companies can access 40-year leases through the leasehold
forestry program. However, leasehold forests currently account for less than 0.5 percent of national forest
area (Government of Nepal, 2010). According to the interim strategy, MoFSC will review and simplify landleasing
procedures for climate change initiatives in order to encourage more private sector investment in
REDD+ projects. Additional details on this strategy are not provided, and interviews with national
stakeholders did not reveal any insights on the potential for increasing private forestry in Nepal.
4.2.3 POTENTIAL INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION
The R-PP and interim strategy have articulated the following general vision for a national REDD+ benefit
distribution mechanism in Nepal. The mechanism would employ a sub-national approach in order to
accommodate different socio-economic, biophysical, and forest management contexts across regions,
although it is also acknowledged that this approach may result in higher transaction costs. A multi-stakeholder
Forest Carbon Trust Fund (FCTF) would be established to collect and disburse REDD+ revenues at two
levels: central and district. It is expected that the Fund would allow enhanced financial transparency and
distributional efficiency compared to an on-budget system. New legislation will be necessary to implement the
Fund.
At the central level, the REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change Cell would be responsible for maintaining a
registry of verified emission reductions as a basis for distributing payments to the district level. At the district
level, District Forest Offices (i.e., the local arm of the Forest Department) would be responsible for
monitoring, reporting, and verifying registered emission reduction activities on the ground. Existing multistakeholder
institutions and benefit sharing mechanisms at the district and community levels would be
leveraged to channel benefits to local stakeholders (see Table 4.1). Key local actors and institutions at this
level are described below.
District Forest Offices:
District Forest Offices (DFOs) are the local arm of the Forest Department. The roles and responsibilities of
DFOs vary significantly depending on the forest management paradigm. In government-managed forests, the
DFO‘s role is to control and protect the forest and to use it for revenue generation. However, most DFOs
have not been given the necessary support or resources to carry out their responsibilities and have faced
hostility from local stakeholders that lack clear user rights (Bampton, 2003). This trend has resulted in a de
facto open access situation in most government-managed forests. In areas under Community Forestry, the role
of the DFO has shifted to facilitator, technical supporter, and overseer of CFUGs. DFOs are also a key
stakeholder in the CFM regime. In fact, one criticism of CFM is that it has given too much control to the
DFO in decision-making and implementation (Bampton et al., 2007).
Local government:
The lowest administrative unit in Nepal is the Village Development Committee (VDC). Above it is the
District Development Committee (DDC). These bodies have not had elected representatives since 2002.
Instead, government employees and unelected joint political party mechanisms make up the Committees,
136 Interview with Dil Raj Kanal, National Federation of Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN).
PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 77