Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

to be harmonized with the 2006 Constitution and to be completed (several important implementing decrees
were never adopted).
The second option, which is favored by the NC-REDD+, emphasizes remuneration of efforts that reduce
carbon emissions, with ―effort‖ being defined as the input in capital and labor. Interestingly, this second
option does not entirely elude the question of land/forest tenure, as land used by a REDD+ project would be
recognized as a form of capital brought to the project. This option would also recognize active contributions
to carbon sequestration, such as land-use practices or technical support. It can, therefore, potentially create a
clearer link between performance and payment: if the principle by which ―those who sacrifice more deserve
more‖ is recognized as the key criterion to allocate benefits, local communities may have stronger claims than
the State in its role of ultimate land owner. This option is also favored by civil society organizations that are
weary of the State‘s claim of being the ultimate owner of all trees and land.
BOX 2.2: LAWS REGULATING LAND AND FOREST TENURE IN DRC
The 1973 Land Law establishes that all land is the “exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible property
of the state” (Article 53). Land is divided into two categories:
� Private domain of the State: parts of this domain can be ceded through perpetual or temporary
concessions, which can then constitute what is commonly perceived as “private property” of
individuals, organizations, etc.; however, these concessions create use rights, not property
rights (Article 61).
� Public domain: land can be solely used for public good or public services and cannot be ceded.
Chapter II of the Land Law recognizes the existence of land occupied by local communities but does
not attach this recognition to any specific rights, and limits it to areas that have not been allocated
through a legal title or for public purposes.
The 2002 Forest Code establishes the same principle on forests: “Forests are the property of the
State” (Article 7). However, Article 9 of the Forest Code also establishes that “trees located in a village
or its immediate vicinity or in a community’s or individual’s field are the collective property of the
village or of the person who owns the field.” The Forest Code also recognizes customary use rights
over forests, which can be limited by law. Customary use rights are defined as the right to use forest
resources for subsistence purpose (communities cannot sell products acquired through their customary
rights).
The 2006 Constitution goes beyond recognizing customary use rights and recognizes customary
property as an individual and collective right equal to statutory rights: “Private property is sacred. The
state guaranties individual and collective rights to property acquired by law or custom” (Article 34).
In a July 2011 workshop on benefit-sharing, the NC-REDD+ and some NGOs seemed to agree that all
direct contributions to REDD+ projects establish a right to REDD+ revenues (i.e., net revenue from carbon
sales), whereas indirect contributions (or those that cannot be quantified) and social safeguards establish a
right to REDD+ benefits. From this perspective, financers and project managers would be the only ones
entitled to REDD+ revenues; while other indirect contributors, such as local communities not identified as a
party to the project (e.g., Ibi-Batéké project presented below), would be entitled to REDD+ benefits. State
agencies providing services such as MRV would be service providers and entitled to a share of the revenue
generated by REDD+ projects, while other State agencies that would not provide any direct service might be
entitled to some benefits. 66
66 These concepts are still being discussed and NC-REDD+ noted that they will be clarified in the following months.
26 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER