Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF NEPAL AND LOCATIONS OF FIELD VISITS Based on the first draft of the R-PP, the REDD Forestry and Climate Change cell (REDD-Cell) also released an interim REDD+ strategy in July, 2010. Both the R-PP and the interim strategy contain preliminary ideas on potential financing and benefit distribution mechanisms for REDD+, which form the basis for this case study. Interviews conducted with national and local stakeholders, including those engaged in the major REDD+ demonstration projects currently underway 128, provide additional perspectives on these emerging concepts. An important caveat that was mentioned during all interviews is the ongoing process to develop a new constitution. Until the new constitution is signed, it will be difficult to talk definitively about legal or institutional reforms for REDD+. The impacts of the constitution in terms of state restructuring will be particularly consequential for the design of any national benefit sharing mechanism. 128 The R-PP and Interim Strategy provide a list of six current REDD+ projects in Nepal. These include the NORAD-funded project explored in this case study, as well as projects led by WWF and the UK Government (DFID). Most projects are currently focused on awareness raising, developing methodologies for carbon measurement, and REDD+ strategy development. 72 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER
FIGURE 4.2: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF REDD+ GOVERNANCE IN NEPAL 129 4.2.1 POTENTIAL FORMS OF REDD+ BENEFITS REDD+ is expected to create a new source of revenue for what is generally considered to be an underfunded sector in Nepal (Government of Nepal, 2010). Current sources of financing for REDD+ include upfront multilateral and bilateral investments in strategic planning, capacity building, and consultation activities. Following the readiness phase, it is expected that performance-based financing from carbon markets (voluntary or compliance), international funds, or bilateral agreements will be the main sources of REDD+ revenue. There has also been some discussion about exploring domestic funding sources for REDD+, such as environmental taxes (REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change Cell, 2010). Estimates of how much revenue could be generated by selling carbon offsets are highly variable and depend upon assumptions about the market price of carbon. For example, one study using a ―conservative‖ carbon price estimated that community managed forests in Nepal could earn between US$3.6–7.2 million per year (Ojha et al., 2008). Another study, which used existing CDM market prices for carbon, calculated a potential income of $90.9 million per year (Staddon, 2009). To put these figures in perspective, the current average annual income from community forestry has been estimated at over $10 million (Pokharel et al., 2008). At this stage, there is no detailed national vision for how REDD+ revenues would be transferred into direct cash or non-cash benefits for local actors. A payment for ecosystem services (PES) model, which would involve direct payments to local communities, has been highlighted as a potential approach in the R-PP and interim strategy. However, Nepal has limited experiences with PES, so further investigation is needed into the potential for this model. In addition to carbon payments, REDD+ initiatives could potentially generate direct benefits for communities through employment opportunities associated with project implementation, 129 R-PP, p. 11. PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 73
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
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3.0 TANZANIA ......................
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AA Autho
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IUPHHK Timber Resources Utilization
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PREFACE The Institutional Mechanism
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3. Increasing experience in Payment
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BOX 1.1: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
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� Risk of deforestation; � Prop
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Priority Ecosystems (INEGI classifi
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Overview of key institutions and ac
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It appears that this project is rel
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deliberate, and continuous outreach
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� Additional reforestation: Befor
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elected as assistants to members of
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MEXICO CASE STUDY APPENDIX 1.1: LIS
Page 34 and 35: Today, the DRC is the most-advanced
Page 36 and 37: 2.2.1 WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF REDD+ B
Page 38 and 39: to be harmonized with the 2006 Cons
Page 40 and 41: FIGURE 2.3: TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
Page 42 and 43: herbaceous or shrubby savanna that
Page 44 and 45: comprised of the 18 clan chiefs wit
Page 46 and 47: NOVACEL staff and supporters is tha
Page 48 and 49: 2.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES As mentioned
Page 50 and 51: These institutions are in essence p
Page 52 and 53: The institutional model for social
Page 54 and 55: In the case of logging concessions,
Page 56 and 57: DRC CASE STUDY APPENDIX 2.1: LIST O
Page 58 and 59: sharing. First, consultations with
Page 60 and 61: emissions). There is also the quest
Page 62 and 63: the village would earn less through
Page 64 and 65: 3.3.2 FUNDING SOURCES Revenues star
Page 66 and 67: village went from earning $50,000 U
Page 68 and 69: hunting quotas set too high by the
Page 70 and 71: Suledo Forest lies in the Kiteto Di
Page 72 and 73: The ZEC aims to acquire rights to m
Page 74 and 75: 3.4.7 EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANC
Page 76 and 77: 3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME
Page 78 and 79: incentives for populations to engag
Page 80 and 81: � The size and composition of agg
Page 82 and 83: Type of organization Organization n
Page 86 and 87: improved tenure security, enhanced
Page 88 and 89: ―distant users‖). Presumably, t
Page 90 and 91: which are housed in the district of
Page 92 and 93: This demonstration project has been
Page 94 and 95: significant backlog of unapproved O
Page 96 and 97: Monitoring and Verification: A moni
Page 98 and 99: management. REDD+ simply provides a
Page 100 and 101: initially be directed towards a par
Page 102 and 103: 5.0 INDONESIA 5.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT S
Page 104 and 105: REDD), and the Forest Investment Pr
Page 106 and 107: FIGURE 5.3: THREE IMPLEMENTATION PH
Page 108 and 109: TABLE 5.1: BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION ACC
Page 110 and 111: Land user partnerships: A REDD+ pro
Page 112 and 113: � Learn lessons and build capacit
Page 114 and 115: identifies the owner and boundaries
Page 116 and 117: carried out by Yayasan Puter will f
Page 118 and 119: 5.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES The RUPES pro
Page 120 and 121: Monitoring and verification: HKm gr
Page 122 and 123: provided by Yayasan Puter was not e
Page 124 and 125: emission reductions. However, emerg
Page 126 and 127: REFERENCES Almeida, F. & Hatcher, J
Page 128 and 129: Graf, S. & Iglesias, L. 2010. Pago
Page 130 and 131: REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change C
Page 132: U.S. Agency for International Devel
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