Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

sustainability of the model. However, the model itself does not rely on carbon revenues to provide cobenefits
to local populations.
Because logging concessions are focusing on one type of activity only that does not indirectly benefit
communities, co-benefits from social agreements will probably be more limited, even though the focus on
social infrastructure and services aims, as in the case of Ibi-Batéké, to improve lives and local economies in
the long term. In addition, local concessions are located in remote areas, and a few kilometers of roads will
not significantly change the fact that these populations are isolated and have limited access to markets.
Financial sustainability:
In the case of Ibi-Batéké, financial sustainability has been an issue from the start. The initial investment was
possible thanks to the familial wealth of Olivier Mushiete and the political connections of the Mushiete
family, which were likely key to get through the red tape and secure administrative authorizations (including
titles over land). Once past these initial difficulties, the project‘s strategy was to diversify activities and thereby
revenue sources. This strategy generated sufficient trust from investors to bring in additional funds and invest
in new areas, such as afforestation activities and carbon sales.
This diversification strategy will be a positive component of a future REDD+ initiative. Even if carbon
revenues are not as high as expected (e.g., market price of carbon credits plunges, unequal carbon
sequestration volumes across years), project viability will likely not be threatened.
The question of financial sustainability in the case of social agreements is addressed differently. Revenues
available to communities over the period of the agreement (five years) are proportional to the number of
trees harvested within the concession. After this period, financial sustainability becomes a more pressing
issue. Social agreements must specify how infrastructure and services will be maintained after five years (e.g.,
parties must agree on a percentage of the funds allocated to maintenance), but communities with limited
financial management capacity will likely face difficulties to ensure that these funds are efficiently used. This
problem could be alleviated if the FDL are used to manage other funds, such as the products of the forest
area taxes or REDD+ investments.
Institutional capacity and the role of intermediaries:
The two models differ significantly with respect to institution capacity and the role of intermediaries. In the
case of the Ibi-Batéké project, all benefit-sharing responsibilities are handled by project staff. Community
capacity building is strengthened in the long term through training in agro-forestry and the availability of
schools, but community-level institutions are not strengthened nor empowered in any other way. Actually,
research shows that they might be de-legitimized over time, as benefits flowing from the project outgrow
those provided by community (or State) institutions. This model maintains communities in a situation of
complete dependence on intermediaries to carry out the project and maintain the flow of revenues.
In contrast, institutions created in the case of social agreements are designed to empower communities that
are legally designated as beneficiaries. Communities will be provided the space and power to negotiate with
logging concessions on what benefits they want to receive, how, and when. In addition, community members
will be co-responsible to manage FDLs and oversee the use of these funds. Whether or not the new
regulation will actually reach these objectives will likely depend on the level and quality of support provided
to communities (and State authorities) to help them understand the new regulation and use the bargaining
power they are given by law. However, the limited administrative burden and the proximity of the institutions
created should allow communities to be autonomous after a few years of experience.
Managing communities’ expectations:
In both models, communities are not generating revenues on their own. Rather, they are merely recipients of
revenues from commercial activities carried out by others.
PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 41