Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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comprised of the 18 clan chiefs within the Mbankana Chefferie. 70 Members of the commission seem to have come to an agreement, which would include the obligation for NOVACEL to provide social services (e.g., health and education centers) and to improve local infrastructure. 2.3.4 FUNCTIONS PERFORMED IN TERMS OF BENEFIT SHARING This section addresses how existing benefits from agro-forestry and agro-industrial activities have been shared in the project. An agreement was reached on how the revenue from carbon sales would be shared and is described below, although no information is available on its implementation as carbon revenues are expected to materialize in upcoming years. As mentioned above, the Ibi-Batéké project is a private-firm investment. Contrary to logging or mining concessions, private firms investing in agro-forestry or afforestation activities are not required by DRC law to provide social services to or to share benefits with local communities. It seems that NOVACEL voluntarily agreed to provide benefits to local populations (and the World Bank is said to have also pushed in this direction). Designation of beneficiaries and design of benefit-sharing rules: As mentioned above, in the absence of a legal basis for local populations to claim a share in NOVACEL benefits, NOVACEL was entitled to decide alone what benefit to share, how, and with whom. Another important point is that the project did not require any change of land use, source of livelihood, or any form of direct contribution from populations (outside paid employees). The land used by the project was said to be free of any prior occupant, although this information could not be verified in this study. However, to receive funds from the World Bank and to register as a CDM operation, Ibi-Batéké project had to meet the social safeguards of these institutions, which include consulting local populations affected by the project and demonstrating positive socio-environmental impacts from the project. The type of benefits shared with local populations is identified in project documents as contributions to local development, mainly through employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, connection to markets, and new infrastructure available to local populations. The project broadly identifies beneficiaries as ―local communities‖ and provides no benefit on an individual basis outside salaries to project employees (most of whom are immigrant workers from other provinces of DRC). In terms of consultations, local populations seem to have been informed and consulted exclusively through their customary chiefs. 71 As mentioned above, the traditional chiefs were able to negotiate that a fixed share (12 percent) of revenues from carbon sales the benefit-sharing mechanism to be used by NOVACEL when carbon revenue starts flowing: Their argument was that ―during the consultations with local communities, the traditional leaders emphasized that the land concession 72 to the Mushiete family was dependant on the provision of social services to the local communities. NOVACEL has addressed this concern by creating a mechanism through which proceeds from the carbon credit sales will directly fund community development activities to benefit local population‖ (World Bank, 2009). 70 More information on the Ibi Commission is provided in 2.3.6, Grievance and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms. 71 Two reports on the Ibi-Batéké project mention these consultations: World Bank, Carbon Finance Assessment Memorandum (Cfam) on a Proposed Carbon Finance Transaction on the Ibi Bateke Carbon Sink Plantation (IBCSP), May 11, 2009, and Ernst & Young et Associés, Ibi Batéké degraded savannah afforestation project for fuelwood production (Democratic Republic of Congo), Evaluation Report, 01 December 2010. 72 The reference to a ―land concession‖ was not substantiated by research conducted for this study. The fact that customary chiefs referred to a concession to the Mushiete family shows that, if negotiations did take place among the traditional chiefs, the content of this negotiation has not been shared or publicized. 32 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER
Interviews with NOVACEL staff did not yield further information on the exact process and rules by which this negotiation was carried out. Delivery of benefits: Some benefits were already delivered by NOVACEL to local communities using revenues other than carbon credit sales, including ―potable water facilities, electrification and social service facilities (schools and pharmacies); as well as capacity building, including teachers and educators, agricultural extensionists, medical services, applied research and development.‖ 73 Olivier Mushiete created a non-profit organization, GI-Agro (see Box 2.4), which is NOVACEL‘s official partner to manage project funds allocated to local development and to ensure that local populations benefit from Ibi-Batéké. In this capacity, GI-Agro receives funds from NOVACEL and will manage the 12 percent share of carbon revenues. BOX 2.4: MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF GI-AGRO GI-Agro has two main activities: research and development in agro-forestry, in collaboration with the universities of Kisangani and Kinshasa; and rural development through agro-forestry. The latter has mostly focused on villages around Ibi and is organized around three objectives: � Strengthen production capacity and develop economic opportunities for the villagers; � Improve villagers’ access to basic social services (e.g., built a primary school and dormitories, a health center with a maternity unit, dug wells to improve access to water); � Promote solidarity through cultural activities (e.g., theater, music, sports); and � Capacity building in agro-forestry techniques and agriculture intensification practices. Source: http://www.ibivillage.cd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=101&Itemid=96&lang=en GI-Agro is in charge of monitoring the construction of the buildings, wells, payment of teachers‘ salaries, and provision of training to villagers. GI-Agro staff based in Ibi village says they are in close contact with the population to hear their needs and feedback. There doesn‘t seem to be any interest (at least from GI-Agro or NOVACEL) to establish a more formalized consultation process. Ibi villagers interviewed for this study provided overall a very positive feedback on the work accomplished by GI-Agro. Some villagers 74 complained that what has been done is not enough, but there was no clear discontent with the project or with GI-Agro‘s work to deliver benefits. 2.3.5 CONSULTATION OF WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES NOVACEL hired several full-time staff to handle interactions with local communities, in addition to its partnership with GI-Agro. More specifically, they hired a specialist on customary affairs, an agronomist, a nutritionist, and an agricultural technician specialized in socio-organization and communication to manage the community development component of the project (World Bank, 2009). The model of the Ibi-Batéké project to manage social benefits through an NGO controlled by NOVACEL leaves little room for the participation of local populations in this process. An argument presented by 73 This document can be consulted on the Ibi-Village website: http://www.ibi-village.cd/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=113&lang=en. 74 This feedback was provided by individuals while our partner was visiting the village. No systematic survey was conducted with villagers. Therefore, this feedback might not be representative of the majority‘s perception. PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 33
Page 1 and 2: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
Page 3: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
Page 6 and 7: 3.0 TANZANIA ......................
Page 8 and 9: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AA Autho
Page 10 and 11: IUPHHK Timber Resources Utilization
Page 12 and 13: PREFACE The Institutional Mechanism
Page 14 and 15: 3. Increasing experience in Payment
Page 16 and 17: BOX 1.1: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
Page 18 and 19: � Risk of deforestation; � Prop
Page 20 and 21: Priority Ecosystems (INEGI classifi
Page 22 and 23: Overview of key institutions and ac
Page 24 and 25: It appears that this project is rel
Page 26 and 27: deliberate, and continuous outreach
Page 28 and 29: � Additional reforestation: Befor
Page 30 and 31: elected as assistants to members of
Page 32 and 33: MEXICO CASE STUDY APPENDIX 1.1: LIS
Page 34 and 35: Today, the DRC is the most-advanced
Page 36 and 37: 2.2.1 WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF REDD+ B
Page 38 and 39: to be harmonized with the 2006 Cons
Page 40 and 41: FIGURE 2.3: TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
Page 42 and 43: herbaceous or shrubby savanna that
Page 46 and 47: NOVACEL staff and supporters is tha
Page 48 and 49: 2.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES As mentioned
Page 50 and 51: These institutions are in essence p
Page 52 and 53: The institutional model for social
Page 54 and 55: In the case of logging concessions,
Page 56 and 57: DRC CASE STUDY APPENDIX 2.1: LIST O
Page 58 and 59: sharing. First, consultations with
Page 60 and 61: emissions). There is also the quest
Page 62 and 63: the village would earn less through
Page 64 and 65: 3.3.2 FUNDING SOURCES Revenues star
Page 66 and 67: village went from earning $50,000 U
Page 68 and 69: hunting quotas set too high by the
Page 70 and 71: Suledo Forest lies in the Kiteto Di
Page 72 and 73: The ZEC aims to acquire rights to m
Page 74 and 75: 3.4.7 EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANC
Page 76 and 77: 3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME
Page 78 and 79: incentives for populations to engag
Page 80 and 81: � The size and composition of agg
Page 82 and 83: Type of organization Organization n
Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF NEPAL AND LOCATIO
Page 86 and 87: improved tenure security, enhanced
Page 88 and 89: ―distant users‖). Presumably, t
Page 90 and 91: which are housed in the district of
Page 92 and 93: This demonstration project has been
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significant backlog of unapproved O
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Monitoring and Verification: A moni
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management. REDD+ simply provides a
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initially be directed towards a par
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5.0 INDONESIA 5.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT S
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REDD), and the Forest Investment Pr
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FIGURE 5.3: THREE IMPLEMENTATION PH
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TABLE 5.1: BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION ACC
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Land user partnerships: A REDD+ pro
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� Learn lessons and build capacit
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identifies the owner and boundaries
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carried out by Yayasan Puter will f
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5.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES The RUPES pro
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Monitoring and verification: HKm gr
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provided by Yayasan Puter was not e
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emission reductions. However, emerg
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REFERENCES Almeida, F. & Hatcher, J
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Graf, S. & Iglesias, L. 2010. Pago
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REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change C
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U.S. Agency for International Devel
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