Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

comprised of the 18 clan chiefs within the Mbankana Chefferie. 70 Members of the commission seem to have
come to an agreement, which would include the obligation for NOVACEL to provide social services (e.g.,
health and education centers) and to improve local infrastructure.
2.3.4 FUNCTIONS PERFORMED IN TERMS OF BENEFIT SHARING
This section addresses how existing benefits from agro-forestry and agro-industrial activities have been
shared in the project. An agreement was reached on how the revenue from carbon sales would be shared and
is described below, although no information is available on its implementation as carbon revenues are
expected to materialize in upcoming years.
As mentioned above, the Ibi-Batéké project is a private-firm investment. Contrary to logging or mining
concessions, private firms investing in agro-forestry or afforestation activities are not required by DRC law to
provide social services to or to share benefits with local communities. It seems that NOVACEL voluntarily
agreed to provide benefits to local populations (and the World Bank is said to have also pushed in this
direction).
Designation of beneficiaries and design of benefit-sharing rules:
As mentioned above, in the absence of a legal basis for local populations to claim a share in NOVACEL
benefits, NOVACEL was entitled to decide alone what benefit to share, how, and with whom. Another
important point is that the project did not require any change of land use, source of livelihood, or any form of
direct contribution from populations (outside paid employees). The land used by the project was said to be
free of any prior occupant, although this information could not be verified in this study.
However, to receive funds from the World Bank and to register as a CDM operation, Ibi-Batéké project had
to meet the social safeguards of these institutions, which include consulting local populations affected by the
project and demonstrating positive socio-environmental impacts from the project.
The type of benefits shared with local populations is identified in project documents as contributions to local
development, mainly through employment and entrepreneurial opportunities, connection to markets, and
new infrastructure available to local populations. The project broadly identifies beneficiaries as ―local
communities‖ and provides no benefit on an individual basis outside salaries to project employees (most of
whom are immigrant workers from other provinces of DRC).
In terms of consultations, local populations seem to have been informed and consulted exclusively through
their customary chiefs. 71 As mentioned above, the traditional chiefs were able to negotiate that a fixed share
(12 percent) of revenues from carbon sales the benefit-sharing mechanism to be used by NOVACEL when
carbon revenue starts flowing: Their argument was that ―during the consultations with local communities, the
traditional leaders emphasized that the land concession 72 to the Mushiete family was dependant on the
provision of social services to the local communities. NOVACEL has addressed this concern by creating a
mechanism through which proceeds from the carbon credit sales will directly fund community development
activities to benefit local population‖ (World Bank, 2009).
70 More information on the Ibi Commission is provided in 2.3.6, Grievance and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms.
71 Two reports on the Ibi-Batéké project mention these consultations: World Bank, Carbon Finance Assessment Memorandum (Cfam) on a Proposed Carbon
Finance Transaction on the Ibi Bateke Carbon Sink Plantation (IBCSP), May 11, 2009, and Ernst & Young et Associés, Ibi Batéké degraded savannah
afforestation project for fuelwood production (Democratic Republic of Congo), Evaluation Report, 01 December 2010.
72 The reference to a ―land concession‖ was not substantiated by research conducted for this study. The fact that customary chiefs referred to a
concession to the Mushiete family shows that, if negotiations did take place among the traditional chiefs, the content of this negotiation has not
been shared or publicized.
32 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER