Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.5.1 LESSONS LEARNED FROM WMAS AND VLFRS: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REDD+ BENEFIT-SHARING
Legal and policy framework: land tenure and access to benefits:
The policy and legal frameworks for WMAs and PFM present a number of important differences. WMAs are
based on a regime of shared management between villages and government. However, the resource itself still
remains public property vested in the President 121, and all revenues generated by the use (consumptive or not)
of this resource are collected by the government and shared with villages that contributed to its management.
JFM follows a similar rationale with one important difference: JFM can only be located on National Reserves
(i.e., land owned by the state), while WMAs are located on Village Land that is legally managed by villagers,
since it is gazetted in their name (a feature shared by VLFRs).
Both VLFRs and WMAs are based on relatively secure land from the standpoint of villages, but the extent of
devolved management rights differs between the two models. In the case of forests, more powers are
devolved to communities, while in the case of wildlife, the devolution is more limited, and based on the
village ceding part of its land to a third party to manage (the AA). The land remains village land, but is
managed by a third party that also manages the wildlife rights on behalf of the village, with the village loosing
considerable control over management and benefits unless it withdraws from the agreement. Several experts
mentioned that WMA Regulations were being revised in ways that would make it harder for villages to get out
of WMAs, as they would lose rights over the land previously gazetted for the WMA. This would raise serious
concerns for villages, whereas many studies report that villagers are already pressured to join WMAs even
when it may not be advantageous to them (Nelson et al., 2006).
As a consequence, the two institutional models result in quite different benefit-sharing arrangements. Villages
receive 100 percent of benefits generated in VLFR (except for sales taxes) and have complete discretion over
the use of these revenues, while villages in WMAs receive approximately 50 percent of revenues collected by
the AA (which receive only a small share of quota fees levied and collected by the Wildlife Division). As a
carbon rights regime is yet to be established in Tanzania, WMAs and VLFRs represent two potential models
that could have radically different impacts on communities‘ claims over REDD+ benefits.
Several experts mentioned that WMA Regulations were being revised in ways that would make it harder for
villages to get out of WMAs, as they would lose rights over the land previously gazetted for the WMA. This
issue would raise serious concerns for villages, whereas many studies report that villagers are already
pressured to join WMAs even when it may not be advantageous to them (Nelson et al., 2006).
Governance and Management: Institutional capacity and the role of intermediaries:
Local capacity appears to be a challenge in establishing the WMAs as much as it is with the VLFRs. External
technical and financial support was found to be necessary for villages to go through the whole administrative
process. The WMAs present additional hurdles by requiring the creation of a new institution (the AA) and the
approval of officials of central government. 122
Experts interviewed for this study seemed to agree that the WMAs remained dependent on facilitation NGOs
after they have been established to continue strengthening the capacity of AAs and of Village Councils.
121 United Republic of Tanzania, Wildlife Conservation Act, 2009, Art. 4 (1): ―All animals in Tanzania shall continue to be public property and
remain vested in the President as a trustee for and on behalf of the people of Tanzania.‖
122 As presented in Box 3.1.
64 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER