Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

The model built for social agreements with logging concessions addresses, at least in design, these three
problems. It provides more bargaining power to communities in the following two important ways.
� First, by recognizing them as entitled shareholders to revenue generated from the use of their land,
thereby entitling communities to negotiate what benefit they want and overseeing the delivery of these
benefits. They are more likely to develop ownership of land-use change decisions and to enforce these
decisions effectively.
� Second, by establishing the negotiated benefit-sharing agreement as a contract with legal force and
establishing local arbitration structures to mediate disagreements, communities‘ institutions have an active
role to play. This approach will create incentives for community members to hold them accountable of
decisions they make.
However, using the model of social agreements for REDD+ will likely require a longer transition period,
where local communities experiment with the new institutions created (i.e., CLGs, CLSs, and FLDs). To be
successful, these new institutions will require external support, which will be provided (at least partially) by
the new program launched by the DRC government to support communities in negotiating social agreements
with logging companies.
Social safeguards vs. land tenure security:
The terms of this debate on efficiency vs. communities‘ rights are connected to another debate as to which
vehicle would best secure local communities‘ access to REDD+ benefits. The NC-REDD+ and many
conservation NGOs are in favor of strong social safeguards, where as human rights organizations instead
favor strengthening communities‘ tenure rights.
The Ibi-Batéké project demonstrates that social standards do not guarantee that communities have a say in
benefit-sharing decisions, and might as well remain passive recipients. This process does not mean that local
communities will necessarily reject the project or not appreciate its results (such as changes in land use
patterns). Rather, the Ibi-Batéké project shows that by bringing important co-benefits, and providing
opportunities for improved livelihoods, it can create buy-in without extensive participation in benefit-sharing
decisions. However, projects focusing more narrowly on REDD+ will probably face more challenges. In
addition, the location of Ibi-Batéké (near Kinshasa) places it in a particularly favorable situation (in terms of
access to market and existing infrastructure) that will probably not be replicable in remote areas where
REDD+ projects are likely to be set up.
PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 43