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Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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emissions). There is also the question of whether or not this approach will focus on <strong>for</strong>est carbon or all<br />

carbon (e.g., agriculture, soil, etc.).<br />

3.2.3 WHAT INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IS PROPOSED TO CHANNEL BENEFITS TO<br />

THE INTENDED BENEFICIARIES?<br />

At the national level:<br />

According to the draft <strong>REDD+</strong> national strategy, all revenues (market and non-market) will be ―received as<br />

grants and deposited directly in the NRTF account‖ (Republic of Tanzania, p. 16, 2010). Sources of funds<br />

listed in the strategy include bilateral and multilateral donors, carbon traders, private sector, and NGOs<br />

implementing <strong>REDD+</strong>-related activities.<br />

Government agencies are divided on whether NTRF should centralize all funds: 89 The MNRT and FBD<br />

seem to be open to various options, including community-to-market relations, while the VPO would prefer<br />

that all <strong>for</strong>ms of payments transit through the state, including from markets and international funds. The<br />

latter justified its position by mentioning corruption at the village level. Non-government experts and<br />

organizations 90 expressed a strong preference <strong>for</strong> a nested approach in which villages can negotiate with<br />

international market players directly. They fear that a model centralizing all revenues is expensive and will<br />

reduce revenues that will actually reach villagers. They also worry about risks of corruption and<br />

mismanagement. According to these organizations, if villagers need to negotiate with NRTF, then there will<br />

be a need <strong>for</strong> strong safeguards 91 and NRTF must be an independent entity.<br />

Although the institutional design of NRTF is yet to be finalized, options favored in the <strong>REDD+</strong> national<br />

strategy would establish NRTF as a semi-autonomous structure most likely attached to the VPO and<br />

governed by a board of trustees composed of high-level ministry officials. These governance principles are<br />

considered insufficient by NGOs and by the Embassy of Norway, which is a major <strong>REDD+</strong> donor in<br />

Tanzania. Many of the Norway-funded pilot projects are designed so that the communities can link directly<br />

with the international market. The Embassy hopes that this approach will encourage the government to<br />

reconsider its position.<br />

At the sub-national level:<br />

The <strong>REDD+</strong> national strategy does not propose benefit-sharing options at a more local level. 92 It does,<br />

however, refer to Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) and Participatory Forest Management (PFM) as<br />

possible models upon which to build. Per MNRT officials interviewed, the option favored by the government<br />

would require the creation of multi-village authorities to address issues of scale and to limit leakage and<br />

transaction costs. Several government officials and NGOs mentioned the importance of ―aggregates,‖ that is,<br />

cooperatives or federations (groups of villages and communities that would receive money from NRTF such<br />

as the Authorizing Authorities of WMAs or associations of villages involved in community-based <strong>for</strong>est<br />

management [CBFM]). These ―aggregates‖ would then be responsible <strong>for</strong> passing <strong>REDD+</strong> money further<br />

down to communities. Village institutions would be responsible <strong>for</strong> managing and investing the funds within<br />

the community. In this scenario, the government would help villages to establish cooperatives and might<br />

establish general rules on how <strong>REDD+</strong> funds must be used (as with WMAs, see Section 3.3 <strong>for</strong> more details).<br />

89 Interviews with MJUMITA and TNRF.<br />

90 Interviews with MJUMITA and TNRF.<br />

91 Although the national <strong>REDD+</strong> strategy does recognize the need <strong>for</strong> social and environmental safeguards and plans the development of an impact<br />

assessment framework specifically tailored to address risks of <strong>REDD+</strong> projects (based on experience with biofuels/land grab), it does not set<br />

standards or refer to existing international standards such as CCBA.<br />

92 According to CARE/Zanzibar, the Zanzibar government was concerned that its role was not defined in the strategy; it was pushing to receive<br />

funds from NRTF and to have allocation authority within Zanzibar.<br />

48 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER

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