Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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identifies the owner and boundaries of a piece of land. As a result, villagers appear to have a strong perception of ―owning‖ the land, even though the SKT certificate directly contradicts the land‘s official status as forest estate. The majority of the land occupied and used by the community is not forested and falls outside of the proposed ERC area. This area is designated as convertible production forest (HPK), and the village has already been approached by several oil palm companies that are interested in developing the area. However, according to the village head, most of the community is currently opposed to oil palm development. Although oil palm would likely bring new employment opportunities and income, many community members have an inherent distrust of oil palm companies and worry about the long-term impacts of oil palm on land productivity. 170 The proposed ERC area begins at the boundary of the HPK designated area and the HP designated area. The HP designated area had been under a logging concession until the late 1990s, and, as a result, the village recognizes this area as being part of the forest estate. Although they may not claim to own the land, they do exercise informal rights to access and use the forest resources. The village elder interviewed for this case study also spoke of the forest‘s value in terms of regulating hydrological and other ecosystem services that the village depends on. 5.3.4 BENEFIT SHARING FUNCTIONS The Katingan project is in early stages of implementation. The project proponents are hesitant to initiate conversations about benefit sharing with local communities before the ERC is granted and before there is greater certainty about the future of REDD+ carbon markets. As a result, a project benefit sharing mechanism capable of distributing revenues from the sale of carbon credits has not yet been developed. Nonetheless, the project‘s early engagements at the village level are providing insights into what an appropriate local benefit sharing mechanism might entail. Determination of beneficiaries: In order to identify villages with legitimate claims to the project area, Yayasan Puter facilitated a participatory community mapping process to identify all relevant land rights and uses. This process has been carried out in four villages, and will be expanded to all adjacent villages after the ERC is secured. Distribution of payments: It has not yet been determined when or how benefits would be distributed to villages by PT RMU, whether they would include cash payments, or whether they would be conditional upon any kind of performance. Starling Resources has indicated the desire to ensure that payments are somehow linked to the development of long-term livelihoods options that are consistent with forest conservation. 171 For example, one payment delivery idea that was mentioned was to pay communities improved and consistent prices for marketable goods they produce, such as rattan. Utilization of payments: The village of Mantaya Sabrang already has nearly a decade of experience managing and utilizing cash grants at the village level through its participation in the PNPM program. With the guidance of the PNPM village facilitator (who is also the FPIC facilitator hired by Yayasan Puter), the village has identified collective investments in infrastructure and community services through a bottom-up and inclusive community decision-making process. 170 Interview with Samsudin Molano, head of Mantaya Sabrang Village. 171 Interview with Rezal Kusumaatmadja, Starling Resources. 102 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER
In the context of the Katingan Project, Yayasan Puter is seeking to facilitate a similar process geared towards community cooperation and collective investment in the generation of sustainable livelihoods. For example, small seed grants have been provided to support the formation of community rubber plantation groups, women‘s revolving fund groups, and manufacture of improved cook stoves. By building community capacity for this type of collaborative development planning and investment, Yayasan Puter hopes to establish a foundation for equitable and sustainable use of future REDD+ revenues. Monitoring and verification: In theory, PT RMU will be able to earn carbon credits if it can demonstrate that current forest carbon stocks are maintained and enhanced. Starling Resources is currently working to develop an internationally credible project methodology for carbon MRV. Given that the surrounding villages are not a significant driver of deforestation in the project area, it is unclear whether it will be necessary to monitor and verify the performance of individual communities with respect to forest conservation. The project developer noted that small-scale illegal logging carried out by villages for subsistence or local commercial use could easily be discounted from the project‘s carbon accounting. 5.3.5 CONSULTATION OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES As a part of the ERC application process, PT RMU carried out consultations on the proposed REDD+ project at the sub-district level. Stakeholders from the village of Mantaya Sabrang, including the head of the village, attended the consultation. Deeper consultations with four villages have been carried out by Yayasan Puter starting in 2009. Yayasan Puter aims to empower local communities to participate in the development of the ecosystem restoration plan for the project area and to maximize potential benefits resulting from the project. Yayasan Puter also aims to develop a model for FPIC between the villages and the project developer. This FPIC model will not be restricted to the scope of the REDD+ project, but rather will prepare the village to deal with any potential outside investor, including mining, oil palm plantation, and timber plantation. In fact, community members interviewed during this case study did not appear to be aware of the link between Yayasan Puter and PT RMU. Yayasan Puter developed an FPIC training module to be carried out over the course of two days in each village. The module provides community members with basic information about FPIC processes, customary tenure rights, patterns of natural resource uses and exploitation, applicable international and national laws, and basic negotiation skills. The first four trainings indicated that the training materials needed to be further simplified, and that additional follow up was needed beyond the two-day session. Nonetheless, Yayasan Puter‘s ultimate goal is to refine the training module into something that can be used by community members without significant outside assistance. Once the ERC has been awarded, PT RMU will be willing to invest the financial resources necessary to carry out a full FPIC process in all of the adjacent communities. 5.3.6 GRIEVANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS PT RMU has not established a formal conflict or grievance resolution mechanism. At this stage, it is not clear whether a conflict resolution mechanism would need to exist at the project level, or if REDD+ conflict resolution would be provided as a government service. Interviews with members of the Mantaya Sabrang village indicated that intra-community conflict is not common, especially since incoming revenues from the PNPM program are spent on collective investments. When conflicts do arise, it is generally possible to reach consensus with support from the PNPM/Yayasan Puter facilitator or the village head. It is expected that the community empowerment activities currently being PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER 103
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERN
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3.0 TANZANIA ......................
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AA Autho
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IUPHHK Timber Resources Utilization
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PREFACE The Institutional Mechanism
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3. Increasing experience in Payment
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BOX 1.1: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND
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� Risk of deforestation; � Prop
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Priority Ecosystems (INEGI classifi
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Overview of key institutions and ac
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It appears that this project is rel
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deliberate, and continuous outreach
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� Additional reforestation: Befor
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elected as assistants to members of
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MEXICO CASE STUDY APPENDIX 1.1: LIS
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Today, the DRC is the most-advanced
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2.2.1 WHAT ARE THE FORMS OF REDD+ B
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to be harmonized with the 2006 Cons
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FIGURE 2.3: TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
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herbaceous or shrubby savanna that
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comprised of the 18 clan chiefs wit
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NOVACEL staff and supporters is tha
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2.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES As mentioned
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These institutions are in essence p
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The institutional model for social
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In the case of logging concessions,
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DRC CASE STUDY APPENDIX 2.1: LIST O
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sharing. First, consultations with
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emissions). There is also the quest
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the village would earn less through
Page 64 and 65: 3.3.2 FUNDING SOURCES Revenues star
Page 66 and 67: village went from earning $50,000 U
Page 68 and 69: hunting quotas set too high by the
Page 70 and 71: Suledo Forest lies in the Kiteto Di
Page 72 and 73: The ZEC aims to acquire rights to m
Page 74 and 75: 3.4.7 EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANC
Page 76 and 77: 3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME
Page 78 and 79: incentives for populations to engag
Page 80 and 81: � The size and composition of agg
Page 82 and 83: Type of organization Organization n
Page 84 and 85: FIGURE 4.1 MAP OF NEPAL AND LOCATIO
Page 86 and 87: improved tenure security, enhanced
Page 88 and 89: ―distant users‖). Presumably, t
Page 90 and 91: which are housed in the district of
Page 92 and 93: This demonstration project has been
Page 94 and 95: significant backlog of unapproved O
Page 96 and 97: Monitoring and Verification: A moni
Page 98 and 99: management. REDD+ simply provides a
Page 100 and 101: initially be directed towards a par
Page 102 and 103: 5.0 INDONESIA 5.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT S
Page 104 and 105: REDD), and the Forest Investment Pr
Page 106 and 107: FIGURE 5.3: THREE IMPLEMENTATION PH
Page 108 and 109: TABLE 5.1: BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION ACC
Page 110 and 111: Land user partnerships: A REDD+ pro
Page 112 and 113: � Learn lessons and build capacit
Page 116 and 117: carried out by Yayasan Puter will f
Page 118 and 119: 5.4.2 FUNDING SOURCES The RUPES pro
Page 120 and 121: Monitoring and verification: HKm gr
Page 122 and 123: provided by Yayasan Puter was not e
Page 124 and 125: emission reductions. However, emerg
Page 126 and 127: REFERENCES Almeida, F. & Hatcher, J
Page 128 and 129: Graf, S. & Iglesias, L. 2010. Pago
Page 130 and 131: REDD+ Forestry and Climate Change C
Page 132: U.S. Agency for International Devel
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