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Institutional Mechanisms for REDD+ - Case Studies Working Paper

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improved tenure security, enhanced access to <strong>for</strong>est resources, and up-front (i.e., not per<strong>for</strong>mance-based)<br />

investments in sustainable livelihoods.<br />

In addition, the R-PP and interim strategy identify broader societal benefits that <strong>REDD+</strong> programs will be<br />

expected to deliver. These indirect benefits of <strong>REDD+</strong>, sometimes called ―co-benefits,‖ are likely to play an<br />

important role in Nepal. Since Nepal‘s potential <strong>for</strong> carbon reduction and sequestration is low relative to<br />

countries with more significant <strong>for</strong>est carbon stocks and higher rates of de<strong>for</strong>estation, there are concerns that<br />

<strong>for</strong>est carbon revenues will not be able to offset significant transaction and opportunity costs. Bundling<br />

<strong>REDD+</strong> strategies with broader ecosystem service, poverty reduction, and climate change adaptation<br />

programs could help to build stronger incentives <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>est protection and to minimize transaction costs. Key<br />

co-benefits identified in the R-PP include:<br />

� Reduced poverty and improved livelihoods <strong>for</strong> people who depend on <strong>for</strong>est resources;<br />

� Enhanced biodiversity, soil, and water conservation;<br />

� Enhanced value of timber and non-timber <strong>for</strong>est products;<br />

� Enhanced adaptive capacity of <strong>for</strong>ests and <strong>for</strong>est dependent communities to climate change; and<br />

� Improved capacity of <strong>for</strong>est management institutions, including local government and local communities.<br />

4.2.2 POTENTIAL <strong>REDD+</strong> BENEFICIARIES<br />

The R-PP and interim strategy discuss three potential beneficiaries of <strong>REDD+</strong>: local communities,<br />

government, and the private sector. At this stage, it is not clear what would constitute a legitimate basis <strong>for</strong><br />

identifying beneficiaries and dividing <strong>REDD+</strong> revenues among them. Several potential criteria are mentioned<br />

in the R-PP and interim strategy, including carbon rights, opportunity cost, levels of ef<strong>for</strong>t and investment<br />

(i.e., inputs), and per<strong>for</strong>mance (i.e., outputs). Broader social equity and fairness concerns underlie each of<br />

these criteria. During interviews, most stakeholders asserted that clarifying rights to carbon in state-owned<br />

<strong>for</strong>ests will be a critical determinant of access to benefits, particularly <strong>for</strong> local communities.<br />

Communities:<br />

There appears to be broad consensus among stakeholders that <strong>for</strong>est-dependent communities should be a key<br />

beneficiary under <strong>REDD+</strong>. Approximately 80 percent of the population in Nepal relies on <strong>for</strong>est resources<br />

<strong>for</strong> some aspect of their livelihoods. Communities, there<strong>for</strong>e, play a significant role in <strong>for</strong>est management and<br />

use regardless of their legal tenure status; their active participation in <strong>REDD+</strong> will be vital to its success.<br />

Currently, there are three main tenure regimes that allow local communities to legally capture benefits from<br />

state-owned <strong>for</strong>est: (1) community <strong>for</strong>estry (CF); (2) collaborative <strong>for</strong>est management (CFM); and (3) buffer<br />

zone management (see Box 4.1). Under each regime, communities are legally entitled to share in <strong>for</strong>est<br />

benefits. However, the relative size of this share has been an ongoing source of tension between<br />

communities, local government, and central government. These tensions are fueled by differing notions of<br />

fairness and by ambiguities in the legal framework 130.<br />

For example, communities participating in the CF program (most prevalent in the Middle Hills region)<br />

currently retain all benefits from the <strong>for</strong>ests they collectively manage in accordance with the Forest Act of<br />

1993. However, the Local Self Governance Act of 1998 entitles local government to 10 percent of revenues<br />

from national <strong>for</strong>ests. Furthermore, MoFSC has shown an increasing interest to reclaim a portion of these<br />

revenues now that community-managed <strong>for</strong>ests have regenerated and become more lucrative (Dahal &<br />

Banskota, 2009). Although their attempts to do so have been unsuccessful to date, the promise of <strong>REDD+</strong><br />

130 Refer to carbon rights case study <strong>for</strong> more extensive review of legal framework.<br />

74 PRRGP INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REDD: CASE STUDIES – WORKING PAPER

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