Letnik 9/2, september 2007 - Slovenska vojska

John J. Le Beau
terrorist plot against passenger aircraft precisely because of timely, actionable
intelligence, properly shared and acted upon before the terrorists could carry out
their plans” (Priest, 2005). The record clearly indicates the utility of intelligence
information, and the operations based upon careful analysis of this information, as
applied against the jihadist-terrorist target. To be sure, an authoritative accounting
of the efficacy of counter-terrorist intelligence operations will have to await the
declassification of substantial documentary evidence, a process not likely to occur
for decades, if then, given the inherent sensitivity of the information on “sources
and methods”. Still, some points can be noted or surmised with considerable
certainty.
First, counter-terrorism operations recently engaged in by the CIA and other
intelligence bodies demonstrate the value of robust intelligence sharing between
and among competent intelligence services. This, perhaps, should by no means
appear counter-intuitive, but in truth the worth of so-called “liaison relationships”
has been much derided within the intelligence community for decades before
9/11. The inclination to favor unilateral over cooperative operations has long been
a powerful school of thought at CIA and elsewhere. There are some compelling
reasons for this. Against traditional intelligence targets at least (such as another
nation-state), unilateral activities have logically been regarded as the more secure,
and surely more traditional, method of operation. In determining to approach or
suborn, say, a Third Secretary from the Soviet embassy in Rome during the height
of the cold war, insisting on a purely American operation, vice one that involved
the Italian service, might have made sense. With two services involved, the chances
of a leak or, much worse, betrayal by a hostile penetration, increase fifty per cent.
The risk of compromise might even be assessed as greater, in the event that the
other service in question is regarded as having a poor counter-intelligence and
security capacity. On the other side of the coin, the value of running a traditional
espionage operation bilaterally would depend ultimately on what the other
perspective partner could bring to the table, the “value added”. If the objective
answer is “not much”, the reason to contemplate a particular bilateral operation
vanishes. As well, deciding to propose a bilateral operation to another service
inherently means revealing to that service the object of attention (in our fictive
case, the Soviet Third Secretary). In the event, the liaison service being approached
(here the Italians) can always decline the offer for any number of reasons, none
of which they are bound to state. Accordingly, in our example at least, unilateral
action promises to be more effective from the U.S. vantage point.
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