Letnik 9/2, september 2007 - Slovenska vojska

NESLIŠNO OROŽJE: RAZVIJANJE OBVEŠČEVALNEGA SODELOVANJA V ...
targeted killing) is not likely to diminish in the near term. Indeed, to the extent that
the quasi or fully autonomous nature of terrorist cells increase (as would appear
to be the case with the Madrid, London and perhaps Mumbai train bombings),
even more of a premium will be placed on the rapid acquisition and transmission
of actionable intelligence to the appropriate parties. In short, the intelligence
weapon has demonstrated its clear utility in combating Jihadist terrorism and has
indisputably saved lives, quite possibly many lives, through the apprehension
and elimination of a number of prominent terrorist personalities. Absent effective
intelligence, the successful application of military force against a terrorist target is
likely to be severely limited.
Despite its successful record as a counterterrorism tool to date, there are sufficient
challenges and potential problems to ensure that wielding the intelligence weapon
against terrorists will remain a complex task. It is notable in this sense that most
of the public controversies surrounding methods the U.S. is employing to combat
terrorism have involved intelligence operations. These range from the legality
of CIA targeted killings (resulting in the death of a U.S. citizen in at least one
instance) to issues surrounding NSA telephone intercepts and data mining to the
existence of secret prisons and the associated issue of permissible interrogation
methods 3 (Eichensehr, 2003). For professional intelligence officers, military and
civilian, these areas represent an operational Terra Incognita. An appropriation of
Lincoln’s phrase, made in an entirely different context, is arguably apt: “Just as our
case is new, so must we think anew and act anew.” (Lincoln, 1862) Over time, it
can be expected that intelligence agencies will critically assess and, where needed,
refine the methods they are employing against the terrorist target, based on results
and consonant with the constraints imposed by a democracy operating under rule
of law. Course-adjustment and judgment as to which methods are fundamentally
sound and which are not, cannot, of course, be expected to take place overnight.
Nonetheless, many intelligence officials agree that the face of intelligence-driven
counterterrorist activities to be encountered five years from now will likely have
a significantly different appearance from the circumstances encountered today.
The issue of interrogation techniques permitted for the CIA to employ against
terrorist detainees is illustrative of this point. It now appears that, in the months and
years following 9/11, these interrogation practices lacked a sufficient, or at least
sufficiently clear, legal framework. The issue was only resolved (at least to some
extent) with authority in late 2006, following robust political debate. It is likely
3
The intelligence methods employed in combating terrorist targets have been the subject of robust public debate.
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