Letnik 9/2, september 2007 - Slovenska vojska

NESLIŠNO OROŽJE: RAZVIJANJE OBVEŠČEVALNEGA SODELOVANJA V ...
A number of recent examples can be cited to make the point, even if the
information available is only partial due, largely, to the inherently secretive
nature of intelligence operations. We might return to our opening example of how
intelligence served as a silent weapon in the targeted killing (that is transparently
what the episode represents) of al-Zarqawi, the savage and quite possibly
psychopathic head of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Available information suggests that al-
Zarqawi was the target of clandestine intelligence collection and subsequent
surveillance by at least three countries, the United States, Iraq and Jordan. The
Jordanians, in fact, may well have been the key player in the chain of events
that led to identifying Zarqawi’s whereabouts. What is certain is that the USAF
launched their bombing run on a specific structure believed to be serving as
Zarqawi’s safe house and operations center of the moment. The tactical intelligence
that lead to the successful killing of Zarqawi was clearly valid, precise and timely
– in short, contained the required ingredients of actionable intelligence. It is quite
possible that the information was obtained and confirmed by a combination of
human sourcing (a spy) and technical intercept. Similarly, the widely publicized
transfer of fourteen “high-value targets” from CIA detention centers to the
Guantanamo facility in September, 2006 strikingly underlines the value of
intelligence cooperation. As announced by President Bush on 6 September,
2006, the al-Qaeda operatives captured 2 and incarcerated by CIA in so-called
“secret prisons” were instrumental in providing valuable operational details that
permitted the “rolling up” of other al-Qaeda devotees, including, notably, Khalid
Sheik Mohammed and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (The White House, 2006). Surely
without serious dispute, lives were saved due to this (undoubtedly complex and
costly) intelligence campaign. It is generally alleged that the network of “secret
prisons” in which the terrorists were detained and interrogated required the
cooperation of a number of foreign countries and their intelligence services. The
information obtained seems to have been shared between services in at least some
instances, notably with Australia. At any rate, the acquisition and exploitation
of information from al-Qaeda prisoners permitted both intelligence sharing and
direct action against high-value terrorist targets. Although popular focus is often
on the boot that kicks down the door to a known terrorists’ room, the critical part
of the counterterrorist equation is ensuring that the boot – SOCOM or other – is
2
For the identities of the fourteen terrorists transferred from CIA custody to the custody of the Department of
Defense, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence http://www.odni.gov/announcements/content/detaineeBiographies.pdf.
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