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PUBLIC OPINION by WALTER LIPPMANN TO FAYE LIPPMANN ...

PUBLIC OPINION by WALTER LIPPMANN TO FAYE LIPPMANN ...

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exhibit. He has so few, because unless he deals with the historic<br />

past, he cannot prove his theories before offering them to the public.<br />

The physical scientist can make an hypothesis, test it, revise the<br />

hypothesis hundreds of times, and, if after all that, he is wrong, no<br />

one else has to pay the price. But the social scientist cannot begin<br />

to offer the assurance of a laboratory test, and if his advice is<br />

followed, and he is wrong, the consequences may be incalculable. He is<br />

in the nature of things far more responsible, and far less certain.<br />

But more than that. In the laboratory sciences the student has<br />

conquered the dilemma of thought and action. He brings a sample of the<br />

action to a quiet place, where it can be repeated at will, and<br />

examined at leisure. But the social scientist is constantly being<br />

impaled on a dilemma. If he stays in his library, where he has the<br />

leisure to think, he has to rely upon the exceedingly casual and<br />

meager printed record that comes to him through official reports,<br />

newspapers, and interviews. If he goes out into "the world" where<br />

things are happening, he has to serve a long, often wasteful,<br />

apprenticeship, before he is admitted to the sanctum where they are<br />

being decided. What he cannot do is to dip into action and out again<br />

whenever it suits him. There are no privileged listeners. The man of<br />

affairs, observing that the social scientist knows only from the<br />

outside what he knows, in part at least, from the inside, recognizing<br />

that the social scientist's hypothesis is not in the nature of things<br />

susceptible of laboratory proof, and that verification is possible<br />

only in the "real" world, has developed a rather low opinion of social<br />

scientists who do not share his views of public policy.<br />

In his heart of hearts the social scientist shares this estimate of<br />

himself. He has little inner certainty about his own work. He only<br />

half believes in it, and being sure of nothing, he can find no<br />

compelling reason for insisting on his own freedom of thought. What<br />

can he actually claim for it, in the light of his own conscience?<br />

[Footnote: Cf. Charles E. Merriam, _The Present State of the Study<br />

of Politics_, _American Political Science Review_, Vol. XV.<br />

No. 2, May, 1921.] His data are uncertain, his means of verification<br />

lacking. The very best qualities in him are a source of frustration.<br />

For if he is really critical and saturated in the scientific spirit,<br />

he cannot be doctrinaire, and go to Armageddon against the trustees<br />

and the students and the Civic Federation and the conservative press<br />

for a theory of which he is not sure. If you are going to Armageddon,<br />

you have to battle for the Lord, but the political scientist is always<br />

a little doubtful whether the Lord called him.<br />

Consequently if so much of social science is apologetic rather than<br />

constructive, the explanation lies in the opportunities of social<br />

science, not in "capitalism." The physical scientists achieved their<br />

freedom from clericalism <strong>by</strong> working out a method that produced

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