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PUBLIC OPINION by WALTER LIPPMANN TO FAYE LIPPMANN ...

PUBLIC OPINION by WALTER LIPPMANN TO FAYE LIPPMANN ...

PUBLIC OPINION by WALTER LIPPMANN TO FAYE LIPPMANN ...

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others make the decisions is quite contrary to experience. The more<br />

subtle the elements that enter into the decision, the more<br />

irresponsible power the expert wields. He is certain, moreover, to<br />

exercise more power in the future than ever he did before, because<br />

increasingly the relevant facts will elude the voter and the<br />

administrator. All governing agencies will tend to organize bodies of<br />

research and information, which will throw out tentacles and expand,<br />

as have the intelligence departments of all the armies in the world.<br />

But the experts will remain human beings. They will enjoy power, and<br />

their temptation will be to appoint themselves censors, and so absorb<br />

the real function of decision. Unless their function is correctly<br />

defined they will tend to pass on the facts they think appropriate,<br />

and to pass down the decisions they approve. They will tend, in short,<br />

to become a bureaucracy.<br />

The only institutional safeguard is to separate as absolutely as it is<br />

possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which<br />

investigates. The two should be parallel but quite distinct bodies of<br />

men, recruited differently, paid if possible from separate funds,<br />

responsible to different heads, intrinsically uninterested in each<br />

other's personal success. In industry, the auditors, accountants, and<br />

inspectors should be independent of the manager, the superintendents,<br />

foremen, and in time, I believe, we shall come to see that in order to<br />

bring industry under social control the machinery of record will have<br />

to be independent of the boards of directors and the shareholders.<br />

3<br />

But in building the intelligence sections of industry and politics, we<br />

do not start on cleared ground. And, apart from insisting on this<br />

basic separation of function, it would be cumbersome to insist too<br />

precisely on the form which in any particular instance the principle<br />

shall take. There are men who believe in intelligence work, and will<br />

adopt it; there are men who do not understand it, but cannot do their<br />

work without it; there are men who will resist. But provided the<br />

principle has a foothold somewhere in every social agency it will make<br />

progress, and the way to begin is to begin. In the federal government,<br />

for example, it is not necessary to straighten out the administrative<br />

tangle and the illogical duplications of a century's growth in order<br />

to find a neat place for the intelligence bureaus which Washington so<br />

badly needs. Before election you can promise to rush bravely into the<br />

breach. But when you arrive there all out of breath, you find that<br />

each absurdity is invested with habits, strong interests, and chummy<br />

Congressmen. Attack all along the line and you engage every force of<br />

reaction. You go forth to battle, as the poet said, and you always<br />

fall. You can lop off an antiquated bureau here, a covey of clerks<br />

there, you can combine two bureaus. And <strong>by</strong> that time you are busy with<br />

the tariff and the railroads, and the era of reform is over. Besides,

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