a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
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114 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />
The Act however recognizes that some other horizontal<br />
agreements could be competitively ben-<br />
national<br />
trade, or could be in the public interest,<br />
and should therefore not be prohibited per se but<br />
should be considered using the rule-of-reason approach.<br />
Section 18 of the Act therefore provides<br />
that applications for exemption of such agreements<br />
could be made to the Commission. In terms<br />
of section 19(2) exemptions can be granted if the<br />
agreement contributes to, or is likely to contribute<br />
to, or result in:<br />
“(a) maintaining or promoting exports from Zambia;<br />
<br />
distribution or provision of goods and services;<br />
(c) promoting technical or economic progress in the<br />
production, distribution or provision of goods and<br />
services;<br />
(d) maintaining lower prices, higher quality or greater<br />
choice of goods and services for consumers;<br />
(e) promoting the competitiveness of micro and small<br />
business enterprises in Zambia; or<br />
<br />
or would outweigh the lessening in competition<br />
that would result, or is likely to result, from the<br />
agreement.”<br />
Professional associations whose rules contain a restriction<br />
that has the effect of lessening competition<br />
in a market may also apply in terms of section<br />
22(1) of the Act for an exemption of the restriction<br />
as long as it does not constitute a per se prohibited<br />
horizontal or vertical agreement.<br />
The provisions on vertical agreements 131 are under<br />
section 10 of the Act, which simply state that “a<br />
vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited<br />
per se, and void, to the extent that it involves<br />
re-sale price maintenance”. The above means that<br />
with the exception of re-sale price maintenance,<br />
all the other vertical agreements are considered<br />
using the rule-of-reason approach under the Act.<br />
This is in recognition of the fact that most such<br />
<br />
such as removal of pricing distortions, optimized<br />
investment levels, and avoidance of transaction<br />
costs. Re-sale price maintenance has been per se<br />
prohibited under the Act because that practice is<br />
prevalent in Zambia and has serious adverse effects,<br />
not only on competition but also on consumer<br />
welfare. Section 10(2) however provides<br />
that a “supplier or producer may recommend a<br />
minimum re-sale price to the re-seller of a good<br />
or a service if: (a) the supplier or producer makes<br />
it clear to the re-seller that the recommendation is<br />
not binding; and (b) the product has a price stated<br />
on it and the words ‘recommended price’ appear<br />
<br />
binding resale price recommendations do not<br />
constitute cases of prohibited resale price maintenance.<br />
The treatment of re-sale price maintenance under<br />
competition law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.<br />
In some jurisdictions, particularly in developing<br />
countries whose economic activities are dominated<br />
by few players, re-sale price maintenance is<br />
per se prohibited because of its serious effects. In<br />
other jurisdictions, the practice is increasingly being<br />
considered using the rule-of-reason approach<br />
uct<br />
distribution. In its treatment of re-sale price<br />
maintenance, therefore, the Zambian competition<br />
legislation takes into account both considerations.<br />
While it prohibits per se the practice, it also provides<br />
that resale prices can be recommended. The<br />
circumstances of allowing re-sale price recommendations<br />
under the Act are very clear and do<br />
not contradict the general prohibition.<br />
The Act does not give examples of other vertical<br />
agreements than re-sale price maintenance. This<br />
may be because section 10 of the Act only deals<br />
with vertical agreements that are per se prohibited.<br />
Most vertical agreements are considered using the<br />
rule-of-reason approach. They are also numerous,<br />
and include agreements and arrangements on exclusive<br />
distribution and dealing, tie-in sales, quantity<br />
forcing, and franchises, which are all common<br />
in Zambia. While the list of vertical restraints cannot<br />
be exhaustive, it would assist the Commission<br />
in its enforcement, and the business community<br />
in complying with competition law, if the common<br />
vertical restraints in Zambia are listed for guidance<br />
purposes.<br />
It is recommended that the Commission<br />
through a Statutory Instrument lists the<br />
common types of vertical agreements and<br />
arrangements that restrain competition in<br />
Zambia for the information of the business<br />
community, and for the guidance of its<br />
competition practitioners.