a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
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216 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />
126 <br />
corporations, companies, associations and other juridical persons, irrespective of whether created or controlled by pri-<br />
<br />
or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them”.<br />
127 The stakeholders interviewed included the Judiciary, sector regulators, other statutory bodies, business associations,<br />
<br />
128 The only remaining major Sate enterprise is the electricity company, ZESCO Holdings. According to the Energy Regulation<br />
Board (ERB) during the interview with the sector regulator on 21 October 2011, there are however no immediate<br />
plans of privatising the company, but to commercialise and unbundle it. The company’s statutory monopoly was removed<br />
in 1998, and there are now a number of independent power producers (IPPs)<br />
129 De minimus<br />
of de minimis non curat lex, “the law cares not for small things”. Essentially it refers to something or a difference that is so<br />
little, small, minuscule, or tiny that the law does not refer to it and will not consider it. In legal terms, the consequences<br />
of an act in violation of a legal requirement may be considered so small that they do not justify pursuing legal action.<br />
130 “Horizontal” agreements are those among competitor, which implicitly or explicitly restrict competitors’ ability to act<br />
independently.<br />
131 “Vertical” agreements refer to those between enterprises operating at different stages of the production and distribution<br />
<br />
132 <br />
least 45per cent of that market; (b) it has at least 35per cent, but less than 45per cent, of that market, unless it can show<br />
that it does not have market power; or (c) it has less than 35per cent of that market, but has market power”. Similar<br />
provisions are found in the Competition Act, 2003 (Act No.2 of 2003) of Namibia.<br />
133 The COMESA Competition Regulations provide in terms of Article 17 that “an undertaking holds a dominant position<br />
in a market if by itself or together with an interconnected company, it occupies such a position of economic strength<br />
as will enable it to operate in the market without effective constraints from its competitors or potential competitors”.<br />
Section 2(2) of the Competition Act [Chapter 14:28] of Zimbabwe provide that “a person has substantial market control<br />
over a commodity or service if: (a) being a producer or distributor of the commodity or service, he has the power, either<br />
<br />
maintain the price of the commodity or service above competitive levels for a substantial time within Zimbabwe or any<br />
substantial part of Zimbabwe; (b) being a purchaser or user of the commodity or service, he has the power, either by<br />
<br />
maintain the price of the commodity or service below competitive levels for a substantial time within Zimbabwe or any<br />
substantial part of Zimbabwe”.<br />
134 nance<br />
by one undertaking, it has not determined dominance thresholds under the Bank of Zambia Act, 1996 (No.43 of<br />
1996) since the market is self-regulatory with no undertaking holding more than 30per cent market share (as submitted<br />
<br />
135 As stated by Robert Anderson, Timothy Daniel, and Alberto Heimler, in the chapter on ‘Abuse of Dominance’ in A<br />
Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy (The World Bank, Washington, D.C. and<br />
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1999), exclusionary abuses are those in which<br />
<br />
<br />
of its market power by charging excessively high prices to its customers, discriminating among customers, paying low<br />
prices to suppliers, or through related practices.<br />
136 As provided for in section 8 of the Competition Act of South Africa.<br />
137 Peter Bamford, David Elliott, Russell Pittman, and Margaret Sanderson, in the chapter on ‘Mergers’, in A Framework for<br />
the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. and Organization for<br />
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 1999,<br />
138 <br />
<br />
<br />
product market and do not have vertical integration.<br />
139 Horizontal mergers present the greatest danger to competition by the mere fact that they reduce the number of