a tripartite report - Unctad

196 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. This
scenario is highly capable of triggering staff turnover
and other human resources problems, hence
immediate prompt remedy is called for to normalize
the situation especially considering the fact
that the Zimbabwean economy is recovering and
creating more demand for competition related interventions.
It was also learnt that CTC have attempted to
raise pay of its staff, but the procedure is too bureaucratic
that the Minister of Trade must consult
the Minister of Finance for approval of pay rise
for staff of the CTC. This not only robs the independence,
given to CTC by ZCA in Section 3, but
also demonstrates the myriad powers that Ministers
have over CTC functions. The implication
of such statutory provisions is that even in the
it shall still have to struggle with approvals of the
two Ministers.
There is limited use of ICT and electronic documentation
of proceed and archives that may lead
to avoidable delays in implementation of activities
at the CTC. There is no website and just recently
CTC have managed to establish its own domain
of emails.
According to the interviewed staff, CTC does not
ing
with ICT; the CTC has signed service contracts
mand
for a full time person to manage ICT then
the Commission will recruit one such person, add-
iting
factor to having such facilities as prudence
may require.
funds to carry out the broad mandate it has been
statutorily given. Table 1 below shows that merger
the CTC followed by Trade Development Levy 198 .
CTC operates with a budget of less than a million
compared to its counterpart in the United Repub-
an increase in the budget of the CTC is strongly
recommended, it needs, however to be noted
that comparing the CTC’s budget directly with the
competition authority of the United Republic of
Tanzania might be misleading since unlike the latter,
the Zimbabwean authority does not have ex-
tensive consumer protection functions, which take
up a lot of resources.
Table 1: Commission’s Income Source Since
2010
Source
2010
(Actual)
($)
2011
(Actual)
($)
2012
(Estimate)
($)
Government Grant 114 154 210 405 319 000
Fees
154 986 267 402 368 450
Trade Development
Levy
657 620 205 986 200 000
Investment Income 0 42 683 50 000
Sundry Income 1 211 5 492 -
Total 927 971 731 969 937 450
Source: CTC
As per section 23, CTC receives money from Parliamentary
allocation, fees and other sources any
other moneys that may vest in or accrue to the
Commission, whether in terms of the ZCA or otherwise
(emphasis by the author). This can be con-
sistent
with the spirit and objectives of the ZCA;
it needs to be limited to issues consistent to the
ZCA.
There is evidence that regulatory authorities have
excess money that emanate from their regulatory
functions. Other jurisdictions (United Republic of
Tanzania and Turkey) have statutorily provided in
their competition laws that they shall receive funds
from the regulated sectors authorities. These would
be examples worth emulating so as to boost CTC
coffers in a bid to have the competition frontier
pushed forward in tandem with the regulated sectors.
This reemphasizes the need to have the need
to have the relationship with the regulated sectors
competition and sector regulator’s laws.
3.8.2 Caseload
The CTC reports on cases that have been handled
to mean all those that have been initiated irrespective
of their closure. Table 2 below summa-
the years. 199