a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
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ZAMBIA<br />
<br />
horizontal and vertical agreements, and for the<br />
share of supply threshold for authorization of such<br />
agreements that are not per se prohibited. In that<br />
regard, section 14(1) provides that:<br />
“Where the parties to –<br />
(a) a horizontal agreement, together supply<br />
or acquire thirty percent or more of goods<br />
or services of any description in a relevant<br />
market in Zambia; or<br />
(b) a vertical agreement, individually supply or<br />
acquire, at either one of the two levels of<br />
the market that are linked by the agreement,<br />
<br />
of any description in a relevant market in<br />
Zambia;<br />
the parties shall apply to the Commission for authorization<br />
of the agreement in the prescribed<br />
manner and form.”<br />
The importance of the above provisions, which<br />
are innovative in competition legislation in Southern<br />
Africa, is that it places upon parties to agreements<br />
that are potentially harmful to competition<br />
the onus of notifying the agreements to the<br />
Commission for examination of their competitive<br />
effects, given the fact that the Commission on its<br />
own cannot possibly identify such agreements for<br />
pre-emptive control. The Act therefore makes it<br />
mandatory for enterprises entering into agreements<br />
that meet the set thresholds to notify the<br />
Commission for the assessment of the competitive<br />
effects of the agreements using the rule-of-reason<br />
approach. The enterprises are thus given a chance<br />
to justify the agreements on the market.<br />
However, in noting that section 14 provides that<br />
the respective threshold for horizontal agreements<br />
is 30 per cent or more of goods or services in a<br />
relevant market, and that for vertical agreements<br />
is 15 per cent, the Commission is of the view that<br />
the opposite should be the case because horizontal<br />
agreements are potentially more harmful to<br />
competition than vertical agreements. The Commission’s<br />
view is supported.<br />
It is recommended that section 14 of the<br />
Act be amended to provide that the share<br />
of supply threshold for authorization of<br />
horizontal agreements be 15 per cent or<br />
more, and that for vertical agreements be<br />
30 per cent or more, not vice versa.<br />
115<br />
Abuse of dominant position is prohibited under section<br />
16(1) of the Act. The relevant provisions state<br />
that “an enterprises shall refrain from any act or conduct<br />
if, through abuse or acquisition of a dominant<br />
position of market power, the act or conduct limits<br />
access to markets or otherwise unduly restrains<br />
competition, or has or is likely to have adverse effect<br />
on trade or the economy in general”. The threshold<br />
for establishing the existence of dominant position<br />
has been lowered from the old Act’s 50 per cent of<br />
production or distribution of goods or services in<br />
Zambia, or any substantial part of the country, to<br />
30 per cent in the new Act. The current provisions in<br />
terms of section 15 of the Act state that “a dominant<br />
position exists in relation to the supply of goods or<br />
services in Zambia if: (a) thirty percent or more of<br />
those goods or services are supplied or acquired by<br />
one enterprise; or (b) sixty percent or more of those<br />
goods or services are supplied or acquired by not<br />
more than three enterprises”.<br />
It is noted that the new dominance threshold of 30<br />
per cent is rather low, and goes against the practice<br />
of higher thresholds that has been established<br />
in the region. 132 It is also arguable whether a rebuttable<br />
presumption of dominance would be more<br />
appropriate than a strict threshold. A few competition<br />
legislations in the region do not provide<br />
for a strict dominance threshold 133 , but experience<br />
has shown that this gives the competition authority<br />
too much subjective discretion in determining<br />
dominance, which can be challenged in law<br />
courts. A mixture of a rebuttable presumption of<br />
dominance and a strict threshold, as in South Africa,<br />
seems appropriate.<br />
The lowering of the dominance threshold from 50<br />
per cent to 30 per cent market share under the<br />
Act has however created marked differences with<br />
other Acts of Parliament that regulate the same<br />
enterprises that are regulated by the Act. For example,<br />
the dominance threshold that is prescribed<br />
under the Information and Communication Technologies<br />
Act, 2009 (No.15 of 2009) is still 50 per<br />
cent of market share. 134<br />
It is recommended that the dominance<br />
thresholds in all the Acts of Parliament<br />
that regulate enterprises in Zambia be<br />
harmonized.<br />
<br />
in Zambia, as in most other countries, are both of<br />
ZAMBIA