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a tripartite report - Unctad

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ZAMBIA<br />

<br />

horizontal and vertical agreements, and for the<br />

share of supply threshold for authorization of such<br />

agreements that are not per se prohibited. In that<br />

regard, section 14(1) provides that:<br />

“Where the parties to –<br />

(a) a horizontal agreement, together supply<br />

or acquire thirty percent or more of goods<br />

or services of any description in a relevant<br />

market in Zambia; or<br />

(b) a vertical agreement, individually supply or<br />

acquire, at either one of the two levels of<br />

the market that are linked by the agreement,<br />

<br />

of any description in a relevant market in<br />

Zambia;<br />

the parties shall apply to the Commission for authorization<br />

of the agreement in the prescribed<br />

manner and form.”<br />

The importance of the above provisions, which<br />

are innovative in competition legislation in Southern<br />

Africa, is that it places upon parties to agreements<br />

that are potentially harmful to competition<br />

the onus of notifying the agreements to the<br />

Commission for examination of their competitive<br />

effects, given the fact that the Commission on its<br />

own cannot possibly identify such agreements for<br />

pre-emptive control. The Act therefore makes it<br />

mandatory for enterprises entering into agreements<br />

that meet the set thresholds to notify the<br />

Commission for the assessment of the competitive<br />

effects of the agreements using the rule-of-reason<br />

approach. The enterprises are thus given a chance<br />

to justify the agreements on the market.<br />

However, in noting that section 14 provides that<br />

the respective threshold for horizontal agreements<br />

is 30 per cent or more of goods or services in a<br />

relevant market, and that for vertical agreements<br />

is 15 per cent, the Commission is of the view that<br />

the opposite should be the case because horizontal<br />

agreements are potentially more harmful to<br />

competition than vertical agreements. The Commission’s<br />

view is supported.<br />

It is recommended that section 14 of the<br />

Act be amended to provide that the share<br />

of supply threshold for authorization of<br />

horizontal agreements be 15 per cent or<br />

more, and that for vertical agreements be<br />

30 per cent or more, not vice versa.<br />

115<br />

Abuse of dominant position is prohibited under section<br />

16(1) of the Act. The relevant provisions state<br />

that “an enterprises shall refrain from any act or conduct<br />

if, through abuse or acquisition of a dominant<br />

position of market power, the act or conduct limits<br />

access to markets or otherwise unduly restrains<br />

competition, or has or is likely to have adverse effect<br />

on trade or the economy in general”. The threshold<br />

for establishing the existence of dominant position<br />

has been lowered from the old Act’s 50 per cent of<br />

production or distribution of goods or services in<br />

Zambia, or any substantial part of the country, to<br />

30 per cent in the new Act. The current provisions in<br />

terms of section 15 of the Act state that “a dominant<br />

position exists in relation to the supply of goods or<br />

services in Zambia if: (a) thirty percent or more of<br />

those goods or services are supplied or acquired by<br />

one enterprise; or (b) sixty percent or more of those<br />

goods or services are supplied or acquired by not<br />

more than three enterprises”.<br />

It is noted that the new dominance threshold of 30<br />

per cent is rather low, and goes against the practice<br />

of higher thresholds that has been established<br />

in the region. 132 It is also arguable whether a rebuttable<br />

presumption of dominance would be more<br />

appropriate than a strict threshold. A few competition<br />

legislations in the region do not provide<br />

for a strict dominance threshold 133 , but experience<br />

has shown that this gives the competition authority<br />

too much subjective discretion in determining<br />

dominance, which can be challenged in law<br />

courts. A mixture of a rebuttable presumption of<br />

dominance and a strict threshold, as in South Africa,<br />

seems appropriate.<br />

The lowering of the dominance threshold from 50<br />

per cent to 30 per cent market share under the<br />

Act has however created marked differences with<br />

other Acts of Parliament that regulate the same<br />

enterprises that are regulated by the Act. For example,<br />

the dominance threshold that is prescribed<br />

under the Information and Communication Technologies<br />

Act, 2009 (No.15 of 2009) is still 50 per<br />

cent of market share. 134<br />

It is recommended that the dominance<br />

thresholds in all the Acts of Parliament<br />

that regulate enterprises in Zambia be<br />

harmonized.<br />

<br />

in Zambia, as in most other countries, are both of<br />

ZAMBIA

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