a tripartite report - Unctad

16 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE
considered in the United Republic of Tanzania entail
only a competition type assessment.
Also in Zambia and in Zimbabwe all mergers
thresholds for Zambia and Zimbabwe have a very
similar structure. In Zambia the threshold is de-
ever
is higher, in Zambia of the merging parties,
bined
annual turnover or assets in Zimbabwe of
A combined turnover threshold like the one
adopted in Zambia and in Zimbabwe is disad-
notify also the smallest transactions and even ac-
of such transactions on the domestic economy is
Each jurisdiction should limit the number of merg-
an increase in market power and that are likely to
create anticompetitive effects on their markets. This
suggests that what matters are threshold triggers
tion
concerned of the relevant business entities to
be able to encompass both mergers and acquisi-
two combined triggers: (a) combined turnover or
assets of all parties to the concentration exceed-
minimum turnover or assets in the jurisdiction. This
is the direction all three jurisdictions should move.
Zambia and Zimbabwe differ with respect to the
90 days, extendable by other 30. However simpler
transactions could be cleared in a much quicker
way. If the law is not changed along the lines suggested
by the country report (a two phases procedure),
the Authority may decide to clear simpler
transactions quicker at its own initiative. Even if
view,
nothing impedes the Authority to voluntarily
choose a shorter one for some transactions.
In Zimbabwe the law does not provide a term
for the investigation to end, once the merger is
as practicable” may cause long delays for a decision.
Although changes in the law would clearly
be preferable to eliminate this challenge, the Authority
should announce unilaterally stricter terms
that it would constrain itself to follow. Or prepare
operation guidelines as a secondary legislation to
give them a force of law.
As for the standard for merger control, also Zambia
and Zimbabwe adopt a public interest test. In Zimbabwe,
once the Authority concludes that a merger
substantially lessens competition, it then determines
whether the merger is likely to result in any
gain which would be greater than and offset the
effects of any prevention or lessening of competition
that may result or likely result from the merger,
and would not likely be obtained if the merger is
prevented. The pro-competitive gains include
economies of scale or other reason likely to result
trade or industry, necessary for the production,
supply or distribution of any commodity or service
in Zimbabwe. What this implies is that in Zimbabwe
like in the United Republic of Tanzania the public
clearly within the best practice in merger control.
wider than that provided in the United Republic
of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In Zambia the law,
petitive
merger to be authorized for a number of
very general reasons, leading to a very long list
of exceptions. In particular, the Authority “may, in
considering a proposed merger, take into account
any factor which bears upon the public interest in
the proposed merger, including
(a) the extent to which the proposed merger is
would outweigh any detriment attributable to
a substantial lessening of competition;
(b) the extent to which the proposed merger
would, or is likely to, promote technical
or economic progress and the transfer to
skills, or otherwise improve the production
or distribution of goods or the provision of
services in Zambia;