a tripartite report - Unctad

PREFACE
pendence is maintained and there are no induced
distortions on the type of actions the Authority
takes. Any funding somehow related to an action
of the Authority may induce the Authority to take
that action, irrespective of the general interests that
the action helps achieving. There is a further advantage
with Government funding, provided that
it is granted in a transparent way and without any
hidden agenda: the Authority may be accountable
for the use of its funding and be required to pro-
This is, for example, the situation in the United
States or in the United Kingdom where Parliament
and Government are periodically actively evaluating
the performance of antitrust Authorities and
repeatedly ask if they provide value for money.
Government funding has some drawbacks because
it may put into question the independence
of the Authority, pushing it to become too complacent
with special interests (especially Stateowned
enterprises). In such circumstances, it may
be appropriate to provide direct funding of the
Authority by some sort of a tax on undertakings,
as has been done for example in Turkey (where the
Authority is mainly funded by a tax on the capital
increases of all incorporated or limited companies
in the country) and, more recently, in Italy (where
the Authority is funded via a turnover tax).
7. Enforcement Record
The individual reports on the three jurisdictions indicate
the output of the authorities in terms of the
number of competition cases that have formed
their caseload over the past: a 10–11 year period
in the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe and 3 recent
years in the case of the United Republic of Tanzania.
The Zambian authority over the period 1998–2010
handled 386 Restrictive Business practices cases
would appear that of the 103 cases handled, 13
resulted in “cease and desist” orders and a further
55 were closed. This would imply that a substantial
number remains open. The introduction of a noti-
up in a large increase in 2010 of new cases and
-
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ter employed in detecting and prosecuting serious
violations such as cartels. Over the same period
there are statistics of Commission’s determination.
The Zimbabwe authority over the period 1999–
2010 handled 220 cases of Restrictive Practices
tailed
data indicates that the Zimbabwean competition
authority takes annually on average around
8 decisions on restrictive business practices, out of
which 18 per cent are decisions to proceed to a
full investigation and 7 per cent are decisions to
the absence of sanctions for violation, at best the
decision can be assumed to be declaration of nul-
competition authority takes on average 10 decisions
per year. 1 per cent of the mergers handled
between 1999 and 2011 were prohibited, while 20
per cent were approved conditionally. In addition,
79 per cent were either approved unconditionally
or not challenged.
The Tanzanian authority over the period 2008/9
to 2010/11 handled 4 cases of Restrictive agree-
and reviewed mergers. A number of cases are
pending before the authority’s and the strategic
plan for 2011–2013 foresees an enforcement focus
on cartel investigations.
This overview of enforcement record suggests
some conclusions. Besides Zimbabwe, each of the
other two authorities has been systematically deciding
more cases related to non-competition tasks
assigned to it than to antitrust, also because violations
of the law associated with these other tasks
are somehow easier and more resources should
be dedicated to antitrust enforcement. Aside from
procedural penalties there are, with some notable
exceptions, very few prohibition decisions. The
notable exceptions such as those in the Breweries
sector (Serengeti Breweries V Tanzanian Breweries,
or that involving Zambian breweries) are an
indication of the scope of what is attainable with
stronger enforcement. The overload of merger
-
and for consumers from implementing competi-
COMPARATIVE ASSESMENT