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ZAMBIA Graph 1: Categories of Cases Handled Since 1998 Source: tion of non-per se prohibited horizontal and vertical agreements for their competitive assessment using the rule-of-reason approach, it is expected that cases involving agreements will drastically increase. Table 5 below shows the trend in cases handled by the Commission since 1998. The Commission’s case load from 1998 to 2010 was a total of 1 996 153 cases, of which 923 cases (or 46.24 per cent of the total cases) involved unfair trading practices. 386 cases (19.34 per cent) involved restrictive business practices, while 331 (16.58 per cent) were mergers and acquisitions, and 235 (11.77 per cent) involved relocation of plant and equipment. The rest of the cases, as also indicated in Graph 1 above, were negligible and their numbers have been declining over the years. Table 5: Cases Received and Handled by the Commission during the Period 1998-2010 Legal Provision 1998- 2001 2002- 2004 2005- 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total (1998 – 2010) Relocation of Plant and Equipment 0 49 79 27 31 49 235 Restrictive Business Practices 94 78 111 19 24 60 386 Mergers and Acquisitions 81 79 78 30 18 45 331 Trade Agreements 36 14 22 4 2 1 79 Trade Associations 7 2 7 0 0 0 16 Control of Concentrations of Economic Power 0 6 19 0 0 1 26 Unfair Trading and Consumer Protection 62 177 306 103 65 210 923 Total Cases 280 405 622 183 140 366 1 996 Source: CCPC 2010 Annual Report Table 6 shows the outcome of competition cases involving restrictive business practices (inclusion of cases involving anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance) that were closed by the Commission during the period 2006-2010. ZAMBIA
154 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE Table 6: Restrictive Business Practices Closed by the Commission During the Period 2006-2010 Commission Decision No. of Cases 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Case closed for lack of serious competition concerns 4 7 6 5 5 27 Case closed on grounds of no breach of the Competition Act 3 4 5 5 5 22 Case closed for lack of competition concerns 2 1 1 0 2 6 Imposition of cease-and-desist order 1 3 0 5 4 13 Totals 10 15 12 15 16 68 Source: ZCC and CCPC Annual Reports None of the competition cases involving restrictive business practices that were closed during the period 2006-2010 were terminated through the im- ing and proving cartel activity. It is hoped that the introduction of a leniency programme in the new Act will expose such anticompetitive conduct and behaviour. It is also noted that most cases were No merger transaction was prohibited by the Commission during the period 2006-2010. Instead, the Commission unconditionally approved cent of the determined cases. The conditions that were imposed on the relatively few conditionally authorized mergers were of a behavioural nature. 170 All the conditions were accepted by the merging parties. The other cases were closed either for absence of merger transaction, i.e., lack of Total closed for lack of serious competition concerns, or for no breach of the country’s competition law, indicative of lack of adequate competition education in the country. The most effective remedial action taken by the Commission was the imposition of cease-and-desist orders. Table 7 shows the Commission’s determination of competition cases involving mergers and acquisitions during the period 2006-2010. Table 7: Determination of Mergers and Acquisitions by the Commission During the Period 2006-2010 Commission Determination No. of Cases 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Unconditional authorization 10 9 15 13 9 46 Conditional authorization 1 2 1 3 10 17 Case closed for absence/cancellation of merger transaction 5 5 1 2 8 21 Totals 16 16 17 18 27 94 Source: ZCC and CCPC Annual Reports Total Table 8 shows consumer cases involving unfair trading practices that were closed by the Commission during the period 2007-2010. Most unfair trading practices cases that were closed by the Commission during the period 2007- 2010 (over 62 per cent of the cases) ended with refunds, or replacement of the defective products. A number of cases were also referred to other authorities for resolution, such as the Zambia Bureau of Standards and other relevant sector regulators, the Police, and institution of court proceedings.
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UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE
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UNITUNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TR
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2 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A T
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COMPARATIVE ASSESMENT COMPARATIVE A
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PREFACE This comparative assessment
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PREFACE agreements. . In the United
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PREFACE Finally in the United Repub
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PREFACE be set at a percentage of t
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PREFACE the market price but constr
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PREFACE (d) the extent to which the
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PREFACE pendence is maintained and
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PREFACE the effectiveness of the or
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PREFACE practical solutions, for ex
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Page 174 and 175: ZIMBABWE FULL REPORT ZIMBABWE
Page 176 and 177: ZIMBABWE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
Page 178 and 179: ZIMBABWE This report is part of the
Page 180 and 181: ZIMBABWE With the growing political
Page 182 and 183: ZIMBABWE of restrictive practices,
Page 184 and 185: ZIMBABWE competition authorities do
Page 186 and 187: ZIMBABWE divided according to geogr
Page 188 and 189: ZIMBABWE The Commission in 2006 whi
Page 190 and 191: ZIMBABWE to take care of themselves
Page 192 and 193: ZIMBABWE (under Section 9); basical
Page 194 and 195: ZIMBABWE Full scale investigation i
Page 196 and 197: ZIMBABWE (ii) to produce any book,
Page 198 and 199: ZIMBABWE The fact that CTC has a co
Page 200 and 201: ZIMBABWE tariat of technocrats, who
Page 202 and 203: ZIMBABWE Table 2: Number of Competi
Page 204 and 205: ZIMBABWE Regarding the handling of
Page 206 and 207: ZIMBABWE (Emphasis by the author) b
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ZIMBABWE Section 5 (1) (f) that pro
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ZIMBABWE Whilst the arguments can b
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ZIMBABWE Anti competitive agreement
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ZIMBABWE by conducting its case det
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