a tripartite report - Unctad

ZAMBIA
charged in other countries in the region, which average a maximum of about
annual turnover or assets in Zambia of the merging parties, whichever is
higher, with a cap of maximum fee of 16 666 667 fee units, which translate
purpose of defraying the Commission’s costs of merger examination, and
transaction costs of mergers.
pansion.
The Government however offered the Commission three years ago
Commission has not occupied because the building needs a lot of renovation.
Board of Commissioners, which is the adjudicative wing of the Commission.
of the Commission’s investigative wing, might therefore present appealable
grounds on determinations and decisions made by the Board on competition
and consumer protection cases.
10. The Commission is expending a lot of resources in investigating relocation
of plant and equipment from Zambia, which raises little or no competition
concerns, for reasons other than promotion of competition. While in the
past, the Commission would recover the cost of these investigations, the new
Act does not provide for a legal instrument to recover those costs.
11. The amounts being allocated by the Commission for its advocacy and
awareness activities, which constituted only 2.19 per cent of its total recurrent
expenditure budget in 2010, are not enough, given the stakeholders’ expectations
and its own admission that lack of awareness of the public on both
competition and consumer issues is a formidable challenge to it.
The Commission’s advocacy and awareness work is also being coordinated
under its Consumer & Public Relations Department, which is under-staffed
and divides its meagre resources between investigation and control of unfair
trading practices and public relations.
mean as a commitment or promise provided to the Commission by a person
or enterprise to address any competition concern raised by the Commission.
tory
monopoly’ as to have the meaning of enterprise.
13. Section 14 of the Act provides that the dominance threshold for horizontal
agreements is 30 per cent or more of goods or services in a relevant
market, and that for vertical agreements is 15 per cent. The opposite should
however be the case because horizontal agreements are potentially more
harmful to competition than vertical agreements.
14. The threshold for establishing the existence of dominant position under
section 15 of the Act has been reduced from the old Act’s 50 per cent of
production or distribution of goods or services in Zambia, or any substantial
part of the country, to 30 per cent. The reduction of the dominance threshold
under the Act has however created marked differences with other Acts of
Parliament that regulate the same enterprises, such as the ICT Act, and this
creates compliance problems for the affected enterprises.
II. Recommendations Directed to the Legislature
165
-
mendations
needs to be implemented simultaneously with recommendation
21, ie. the provision of adequate government funding for the Commission.
by the Government should be expedited to enable its speedy occupation.
It should be made very clear through a Statutory Instrument that the ex
Commissioners does not give him voting rights on competition and consumer
protection cases being determined by the Board.
The Commission should stop using its scarce resources in investigating relo-
tion
complaints or concerns, and consider any competition concerns arising
from such relocations using other competition instruments, such as merger
control.
and awareness activities, constituting not less than 5 per cent of its annual
recurrent expenditure budget, and that the activities should be undertaken
-
tion
of the term ‘statutory monopoly’ should be removed.
Section 14 of the CCPA should be amended to provide that the share of
supply threshold for authorization of horizontal agreements be 15 per cent
or more, and that for vertical agreements be 30 per cent or more, not vice
versa.
The dominance thresholds in all the Acts of Parliament that regulate enterprises
in Zambia be harmonized.
ZAMBIA