a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
a tripartite report - Unctad
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54 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />
a rule of reason approach where the Commission<br />
<br />
and “materially” restrain or reduce competition (in<br />
<br />
-<br />
<br />
merger and the Commission would have to simulate<br />
ably<br />
and materially restrain or reduce competition.<br />
In addition, the Commission has to prove that the<br />
merged entity’s share of the market exceeds 35 per<br />
cent. In other words, even if the Commission would<br />
-<br />
<br />
to merit the rejection of the merger by the Commission.<br />
The next step would be to show whether this<br />
petition<br />
has a market share exceeding 35 per cent.<br />
Strictly speaking, subsection (a) should be consid-<br />
<br />
in addition<br />
35 per cent. The issue should rather be whether the<br />
<br />
competition. What happens after the analysis shows<br />
<br />
market share is 34 per cent? The law prevents the<br />
FCC from prohibiting such a merger.<br />
With respect to the substantive test provided by<br />
Section 11(1) and Section 5(6) of the Act, the<br />
Commission Merger Guidelines identify three scenarios<br />
that will eventually dictate the verdict of the<br />
merger application. 55 The scenarios are as follow:<br />
(i) Post Merger Firm’s Market Share below 35 per<br />
cent<br />
Most of such merger applications are approved<br />
<br />
working days, as they are unlikely to prevent, restrain<br />
or distort competition, but to the contrary<br />
Merger<br />
guidelines, the FCC has recognized that there are<br />
certain grounds that may raise substantial competition<br />
concerns, which necessitate further request<br />
for information and hence full analysis that takes<br />
up to 90 days, the FCA does not allow to block<br />
mergers where the combined post merger market<br />
share is below 35 per cent.<br />
(ii) Post Merger Firm’s Market Share above 35<br />
per cent and Acting alone the Firm can not<br />
substantially restrain Competition<br />
<br />
share exceeds 35 per cent, the Commission can<br />
still approve a merger provided that parties to the<br />
merger demonstrate to the Commission that act-<br />
<br />
and materially restrain or reduce competition in<br />
sidering<br />
approval of such a merger with regard to<br />
<br />
cant<br />
period of time, the Commission shall consider<br />
the following factors:<br />
(a) The Number and Size of Participants In<br />
the Market<br />
(b) Barriers to Entry<br />
(c) Vertical Integration<br />
(d) Availability of Alternatives to the Services<br />
or Goods Provided by the Merging Firms<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
(lower taxation or input costs as a result of<br />
improved bargaining power).<br />
(f) Effect of the Proposed Merger to<br />
Consumers, Competition and the<br />
Economy (e.g. likelihood of sustained<br />
price increases, the removal of adequate<br />
alternative supplies, the protection of<br />
<br />
<br />
(iii) Post Merger Firm’s Market Share above<br />
35 per cent and Acting alone the Firm can<br />
substantially restrain Competition<br />
If the post merger market share exceeds 35 per<br />
<br />
materially restrain or reduce competition in the<br />
<br />
prohibited according to Section 11 (1). However,<br />
the applicant may apply for an exemption according<br />
to Section 13 in order to effect the merger.<br />
<br />
under the FCA 56 <br />
turnover or assets above threshold amounts set by<br />
the FCC. The gazetted threshold is of Tanzanian Shillings<br />
800 million. 57 If within 14 days after receipt of a<br />
<br />
proposed merger should be examined, the merger