01.06.2013 Views

a tripartite report - Unctad

a tripartite report - Unctad

a tripartite report - Unctad

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

188 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE<br />

independency is silently withdrawn by Section 18<br />

that the Minister may give the Commission such<br />

general directions relating to the policy the Commission<br />

is to observe in the exercise of its functions<br />

as the Minister considers being necessary in the<br />

national interest.<br />

<br />

and in the general context within which they are<br />

mentioned, they pose a huge potential for interferences<br />

with the independency provided for<br />

in Section 5(3) notwithstanding the caveats prescribed<br />

in Section 18 (2) especially considering<br />

the manner the Commission is supposed to act<br />

to such policy directions as provided in Section 18<br />

(3) that the Commission shall take all necessary<br />

steps to comply with any direction given to it by<br />

the Minister.<br />

With regard to validity of decisions and acts of<br />

Commission and committees as provided under<br />

Section 19 that “No decision or act of the Commission<br />

or a committee and no act that is authorized<br />

by the Commission or a committee shall be invalid<br />

solely because there was a vacancy in the membership<br />

of the Commission or the committee or<br />

<br />

a member of the Commission or the committee,<br />

as the case may be, at the time the decision was<br />

taken or the act was done or authorized.<br />

This provision can be construed to defeat the purpose<br />

of appointment of members as provided under<br />

Section 6 and validity of meetings where decisions<br />

are made (regarding quorum) as provided<br />

under Section 13 (6) thus being contrary to principles<br />

of good regulation that ensures due process<br />

in delivery of competition justice.<br />

3.1.2 The Directorate of the CTC<br />

The organigram of the CTC as supported by the<br />

ZCA provides for the Board of Commissioners as<br />

the oversight Board which works supervises the<br />

Secretariat/Directorate which is led by a director<br />

as appointed under Section 17 (1) and Assistant<br />

Directors under Section 17 (6).<br />

The internal structure of the directorate is deemed<br />

to be ideal given the prevailing conditions that<br />

CTC also deal with Tariff as another core mandate,<br />

thus having a division of its own. The structure ca-<br />

<br />

be subdivided into narrow thematic areas such as<br />

mergers and cartels as the law develops overtime.<br />

Staff recruitment has also been done to complement<br />

the dichotomy of law and economics ideal<br />

for a competition authority.<br />

Problems lie with the relative inexperience of most<br />

staff and the lack of specialized training on competition<br />

as shall be discussed later in the subsequent<br />

subtopics.<br />

3.2 Sources of Competition Cases<br />

Statutorily, CTC’s major sources of competition<br />

cases are (i) complaints from the business community<br />

and the general public (ii) concerns learnt<br />

toral<br />

studies (iv) ministerial instructions from the<br />

government (v) referrals from sector regulators.<br />

These are conventional ways for which competition<br />

authorities globally employ in identifying issues<br />

to be dealt with by competition law. Handling<br />

of the complaints is as provided hereunder.<br />

3.2.1 Handling of Competition<br />

Complaints at CTC<br />

CTC’s directorate undertakes preliminary investigation<br />

into the allegation in order to identify and<br />

assess the nature of competition issue so as to<br />

establish a prima facie case for a full-scale investigation<br />

under Section 28 of the ZCA. The investigations<br />

undertaken involve information gathering<br />

and interviews with major stakeholders (competitors,<br />

customers, suppliers, policymakers, etc.) and<br />

analysis of the information gathered. Draft <strong>report</strong>s<br />

(with appropriate recommendations) on the preliminary<br />

investigations undertaken are thoroughly<br />

considered and debated by the Directorate’s Operations<br />

Committee before they are submitted to<br />

the relevant Committee of the Commission 188 and<br />

ultimately to the full Commission for determination.<br />

According to CTC <strong>report</strong>s, there are four committees<br />

formed, Audit & Administration Committee,<br />

Mergers & Restrictive Practices Committee, Tariffs<br />

Committee and the Legal & Enforcement Committee.<br />

The committees would basically sit to deliberate<br />

and sharpen recommendations emanating<br />

from Directorate’s Operations Committee in<br />

the spirit of bettering the exercise of CTC’s function<br />

as provided under Section 14 (1).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!