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ZIMBABWE Regarding the handling of case of anticompetitive behavior, it should be pointed out that there are a number of success stories in the Commission’s handling of competition cases. As found out in a study undertaken in 2008 on the impact of the implementation of competition policy and law in Zimbabwe 203 , the control and abolishment of restrictive socio-economic nature in the country. The Commission’s competition intervention into various industries and sectors in Zimbabwe through the issuance of remedial orders and conclusion of Consent Agreements or Undertakings on restrictive business practices can be summarized as follows: horizontal restraints arising from collusive and cartel-like behaviour of a grossly anticompetitive nature were abolished in key and essential industries and sectors, such as the cement industry, the coal industry and the dry cleaning and laundry services sector; vertical restraints with substantial economic and under control, in other essential industries like the coal tar fuel industry; in consumer products industries such as the alcoholic beverages industry and the cigarette industry, as well as in utilities sectors such as electricity and telecommunications that directly affect the consumer, were brought to an end; and entry barriers were removed in industries such as the cement industry, the coal industry, the sugar industry, and the fertilizer industry, resulting in the introduction of new economic players and increased employment. More recently, the Commission’s intervention in the health insurance services sector, through its full-scale investigation into the abusive practices Table 6: Commission’s Merger Determinations From 1999 to Date Merger Determination Period 1999-2005 2006-2009 2010-2011 2012 to date Source: CTC 199 by Cimas Medical Aid Society against liver dialysis patients, resulted in the issuance of remedial orders that not only strengthened competition in that sector but also had immense consumer protection sector, through another full-scale investigation into abuse of monopoly position by the electricity utility, also got acclaims from the government, the business community, and the general public because its remedial orders had far-reaching positive implications of a socio-economic nature. Despite these success stories, given the architecture of the law with regard to issues is considered to be Restrictive Practices in ZCA and the nature prohibitions associated to the anticompetitive restrictive practices, without prejudice to the sovereignty of CTC’s decisions, it is logical to conclude that there is need a new law to properly provide for restrictive practices, identify and sharpen offences associates to such practices and prohibit the same commensurately. Invariably, there arises an issue of concern as to what makes many cases be dropped after they that the inadequacies in the law and lack of proper competition knowledge at both the staff and Commission levels have contributed to such a scenario, hence the need for remedial action to such undesired state of affairs at CTC. 3.8.2.2 Merger control The Commission has made determinations on a total of 137 mergers and acquisitions since it effectively commenced its operations in 1999. Of those, 71 transactions were determined during the period 1999-2005, 49 during the period 2006-2009, 16 during the period 2010-2011, and 1 already determined so far during the current 2012 year, as shown in Table 6 below: Comments Of the 71 mergers that were determined during the period 1999-2005, 52 were approved without any conditions, 11 were approved with some conditions204, 6 were not challenged205, and 2 were prohibited. Of the 49 mergers and acquisitions that the Commission determined during the period 2006-2009, 33 were approved without any conditions, 11 were approved with some conditions, and 5 were not challenged.` Of the 16 mergers that were determined during the period 2010-2011, 11 were approved unconditionally, while the remaining 5 were approved with some conditions. So far this year, the only merger that was determined by the Commission was approved without any conditions. ZIMBABWE
200 VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF CLP: A TRIPARTITE REPORT ON THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA – ZAMBIA – ZIMBABWE Table 7 below summarizes the Commission’s determinations of mergers and acquisitions since 1999. Table 7: Summarized Commission Determinations on Mergers Since 1999 Commission Determination No. of Merger Cases 1999-2005 2006-2009 2010-2011 2012 (to date) Total Percentage Unconditional Approval 52 33 11 1 97 71 per cent Conditional Approval 11 11 5 0 27 20 per cent Not Challenged 6 5 0 0 11 8 per cent Rejected/ Prohibited 2 0 0 0 2 1 per cent Totals 71 49 16 1 137 100 per cent The socio-economic impact of the Commission’s merger control activities has also been notable. In of competition policy and law in Zimbabwe that was undertaken in 2006 206 , it was found that spe- the mergers that were conditionally approved by the Commission included the following: utilization (Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger, BP Zimbabwe/Castrol Zimbabwe merger, Zimboard Products/PG Bison Mauritius merger); restoration of plant productivity (Portland Holdings/Pretoria Portland Cement merger, Zimboard Products/PG Bison Mauritius merger); of requirements and leveraging advantage (Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger, Shashi Private Hospital/PSMI merger); distribution (Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger); increased competence and maintenance of market share through technical and commercial support (Portland Holdings/Pretoria Portland Cement merger); introduction of self-reliance in input requirements (Delta Beverages/Mr Juicy merger); improvement in product quality (Zimboard Products/PG Bison Mauritius merger); and effective turnaround from operating loss to Zimboard Products/PG Bison Mauritius merger). Subsequent conditionally approved mergers also e.g., the more recently the Total Zimbabwe/Mobil Oil merger, the Schweppes Zimbabwe/Delta Beverages merger, the Burley Marketing Zimbabwe/Farma-Rama merger, the West Beverages/Starafricacorporation merger, and the Olivine Holdings/Cotton Company of Zimbabwe merger. It can therefore safely be concluded that there are many documented success stories in the Commission’s handling of competition cases. The socioeconomic impact of the Commission’s effective implementation of competition policy and law in Zimbabwe, through its handling of competition cases, has been notable. The Commission has tackled the major competition concerns in Zim- 3.8.3 Priorities and Management Currently, the focus is mainly on mergers and is being managed with the limited context the CTC operates. There is now need to open horizons and venture into area of cartels and abuse of dominance. To do this, the enabling legislation has to be re worked to ensure smooth take off based on best practices. 4.0 LIMITS OF COMPETITION POLICY: EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL REGULATORY REGIMES 4.1 Economy-wide Exemptions and Special Treatments Section 3 (1) of the ZCA provides that it applies to all economic activities within or having an effect within the Republic of Zimbabwe
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Page 174 and 175: ZIMBABWE FULL REPORT ZIMBABWE
Page 176 and 177: ZIMBABWE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE
Page 178 and 179: ZIMBABWE This report is part of the
Page 180 and 181: ZIMBABWE With the growing political
Page 182 and 183: ZIMBABWE of restrictive practices,
Page 184 and 185: ZIMBABWE competition authorities do
Page 186 and 187: ZIMBABWE divided according to geogr
Page 188 and 189: ZIMBABWE The Commission in 2006 whi
Page 190 and 191: ZIMBABWE to take care of themselves
Page 192 and 193: ZIMBABWE (under Section 9); basical
Page 194 and 195: ZIMBABWE Full scale investigation i
Page 196 and 197: ZIMBABWE (ii) to produce any book,
Page 198 and 199: ZIMBABWE The fact that CTC has a co
Page 200 and 201: ZIMBABWE tariat of technocrats, who
Page 202 and 203: ZIMBABWE Table 2: Number of Competi
Page 206 and 207: ZIMBABWE (Emphasis by the author) b
Page 208 and 209: ZIMBABWE Section 5 (1) (f) that pro
Page 210 and 211: ZIMBABWE Whilst the arguments can b
Page 212 and 213: ZIMBABWE Anti competitive agreement
Page 214: ZIMBABWE by conducting its case det
Page 227: Printed at United Nations, Geneva -
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