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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS<br />

This work aims at providing a theoretical framework to consider policy<br />

regimes while testing for price transmission, and at developing different models<br />

for the empirical analysis.<br />

The case study is constituted by international soft wheat markets in the years<br />

1978-2003. The French and the US prices are assumed to represent, respectively,<br />

the EU and the world ones.<br />

This work tries to shed light on a mixed empirical evidence. Indeed, the Law of<br />

One Price is often found not to hold in practice. Many factors are supposed to<br />

prevent prices from convergence: amongst them, policy measures are expected to<br />

play a relevant role.<br />

This is true in particular for the agricultural sector, traditionally characterized<br />

by high levels of policy intervention. The recent rise in food prices on<br />

international commodity markets drew new attention on price transmission<br />

mechanisms and, specifically, on the effects of policy intervention.<br />

Theoretical considerations on the functioning of domestic and border policies<br />

on international wheat markets (paragraph 4.3) lead to the basic assumption that<br />

the domestic EU price and the world one are expected to interact only when the<br />

latter is above the EU intervention price. The relative position of this policy<br />

variable and of the US price allows to define different policy regimes;<br />

alternatively, the intervention price can be considered as a threshold for the US<br />

price to interact with the European one.<br />

Accordingly to these theoretical considerations, different empirical models are<br />

derived.<br />

At first (chapter 5) the intervention price is used in different ways. Either a<br />

composite variable is built, constituted by the maximum between the intervention<br />

and the US price, or the LOP is imposed to hold between the French price and<br />

either the US or the intervention price depending on the policy regime in place,<br />

i.e. on which of the two prices is higher. In this case, either the adjustment<br />

coefficients, or the long run transmission elasticities, or, finally, both, are allowed<br />

to change.

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