TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS<br />
This work aims at providing a theoretical framework to consider policy<br />
regimes while testing for price transmission, and at developing different models<br />
for the empirical analysis.<br />
The case study is constituted by international soft wheat markets in the years<br />
1978-2003. The French and the US prices are assumed to represent, respectively,<br />
the EU and the world ones.<br />
This work tries to shed light on a mixed empirical evidence. Indeed, the Law of<br />
One Price is often found not to hold in practice. Many factors are supposed to<br />
prevent prices from convergence: amongst them, policy measures are expected to<br />
play a relevant role.<br />
This is true in particular for the agricultural sector, traditionally characterized<br />
by high levels of policy intervention. The recent rise in food prices on<br />
international commodity markets drew new attention on price transmission<br />
mechanisms and, specifically, on the effects of policy intervention.<br />
Theoretical considerations on the functioning of domestic and border policies<br />
on international wheat markets (paragraph 4.3) lead to the basic assumption that<br />
the domestic EU price and the world one are expected to interact only when the<br />
latter is above the EU intervention price. The relative position of this policy<br />
variable and of the US price allows to define different policy regimes;<br />
alternatively, the intervention price can be considered as a threshold for the US<br />
price to interact with the European one.<br />
Accordingly to these theoretical considerations, different empirical models are<br />
derived.<br />
At first (chapter 5) the intervention price is used in different ways. Either a<br />
composite variable is built, constituted by the maximum between the intervention<br />
and the US price, or the LOP is imposed to hold between the French price and<br />
either the US or the intervention price depending on the policy regime in place,<br />
i.e. on which of the two prices is higher. In this case, either the adjustment<br />
coefficients, or the long run transmission elasticities, or, finally, both, are allowed<br />
to change.