TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
TESTING INTERNATIONAL PRICE TRANSMISSION UNDER ...
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Empirical Tests for Spatial Price Analysis<br />
Unidirectional causality between two prices can be seen as informational<br />
inefficiency, since the second price is not incorporating the information coming<br />
from the first one, and its values could be predicted on the basis of those of the<br />
second one (see, for example, Gupta and Mueller 1982, p.303). Nonetheless, as<br />
Fackler and Goodwin point out (2001, p.998), the dynamics in the price<br />
adjustments, owing for example to delivery lags, could make this assumption<br />
questionable.<br />
GC analysis, together with IRFs (see paragraph 3.2.2.3) often accompanies<br />
dynamic model studies in empirical works.<br />
3.2.2.2 Ravallion and Timmer market integration criteria<br />
Ravallion’s model, as presented in his original article (Ravallion 1986), builds<br />
up a radial structure with a central market and other satellites ones. Together with<br />
the Timmer model (which, as explained further in this paragraph, directly stems<br />
from Ravallion’s one), it can be interpreted as a VAR model with tests of<br />
restrictions on the reduced-form parameters of the model (Fackler and Goodwin<br />
2001, p.1000). Ravallion’s model is described in equations (3.12) and (3.13). The<br />
price in market 1 is influenced by contemporary and lagged prices in all other<br />
markets and its own lags, while the price in any of the other i markets is<br />
influenced by the contemporary and lagged values of the price in market 1 and its<br />
own lagged values, only. Two equations describe the price transmission<br />
mechanisms, but, due to under-identification problems, only the second one is<br />
used in practice:<br />
n<br />
P 1 , t = ∑ a1,<br />
jP1<br />
, t−<br />
j<br />
m n<br />
k<br />
+ ∑ ∑ β i,<br />
jPk<br />
, t−<br />
j + X1,<br />
tc1<br />
+ e1,<br />
t<br />
j=<br />
1<br />
k=<br />
2 j=<br />
0<br />
n<br />
n<br />
P i,<br />
t = ∑ ai,<br />
jPi<br />
, t−<br />
j + ∑ β i,<br />
jP1<br />
, t−<br />
j + X i,<br />
tci<br />
+ ei,<br />
t<br />
j=<br />
1<br />
j=<br />
0<br />
(3.12)<br />
(3.13)<br />
where Xi is a vector of other influences on local markets. Normally, it is equation<br />
(3.13) which is used; if βi,j = 0, we have market segmentation, since the market 1<br />
doesn’t influence the market i. On the other side, if βi,0 = 1, immediate<br />
transmission is present. We have “strong” short run integration if βi,0 = 1 and αi,j =<br />
βi,j = 0 for any j > 0 (the lagged prices have no influence), while we can talk about<br />
a “weaker” short run market integration if<br />
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