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Empirical Tests for Spatial Price Analysis<br />

Unidirectional causality between two prices can be seen as informational<br />

inefficiency, since the second price is not incorporating the information coming<br />

from the first one, and its values could be predicted on the basis of those of the<br />

second one (see, for example, Gupta and Mueller 1982, p.303). Nonetheless, as<br />

Fackler and Goodwin point out (2001, p.998), the dynamics in the price<br />

adjustments, owing for example to delivery lags, could make this assumption<br />

questionable.<br />

GC analysis, together with IRFs (see paragraph 3.2.2.3) often accompanies<br />

dynamic model studies in empirical works.<br />

3.2.2.2 Ravallion and Timmer market integration criteria<br />

Ravallion’s model, as presented in his original article (Ravallion 1986), builds<br />

up a radial structure with a central market and other satellites ones. Together with<br />

the Timmer model (which, as explained further in this paragraph, directly stems<br />

from Ravallion’s one), it can be interpreted as a VAR model with tests of<br />

restrictions on the reduced-form parameters of the model (Fackler and Goodwin<br />

2001, p.1000). Ravallion’s model is described in equations (3.12) and (3.13). The<br />

price in market 1 is influenced by contemporary and lagged prices in all other<br />

markets and its own lags, while the price in any of the other i markets is<br />

influenced by the contemporary and lagged values of the price in market 1 and its<br />

own lagged values, only. Two equations describe the price transmission<br />

mechanisms, but, due to under-identification problems, only the second one is<br />

used in practice:<br />

n<br />

P 1 , t = ∑ a1,<br />

jP1<br />

, t−<br />

j<br />

m n<br />

k<br />

+ ∑ ∑ β i,<br />

jPk<br />

, t−<br />

j + X1,<br />

tc1<br />

+ e1,<br />

t<br />

j=<br />

1<br />

k=<br />

2 j=<br />

0<br />

n<br />

n<br />

P i,<br />

t = ∑ ai,<br />

jPi<br />

, t−<br />

j + ∑ β i,<br />

jP1<br />

, t−<br />

j + X i,<br />

tci<br />

+ ei,<br />

t<br />

j=<br />

1<br />

j=<br />

0<br />

(3.12)<br />

(3.13)<br />

where Xi is a vector of other influences on local markets. Normally, it is equation<br />

(3.13) which is used; if βi,j = 0, we have market segmentation, since the market 1<br />

doesn’t influence the market i. On the other side, if βi,0 = 1, immediate<br />

transmission is present. We have “strong” short run integration if βi,0 = 1 and αi,j =<br />

βi,j = 0 for any j > 0 (the lagged prices have no influence), while we can talk about<br />

a “weaker” short run market integration if<br />

29

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