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3 Issuing costs of state guaranteed bonds - Financial Risk and ...

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2 Overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantee schemes<br />

2.1 Introduction<br />

2 Overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantee schemes<br />

The intensification <strong>of</strong> the financial crisis had marked impacts on the EU banking sector, particularly<br />

through 2008Q4. This incited national governments to support financial institutions through a<br />

range <strong>of</strong> rescue programmes, including <strong>state</strong> guarantees.<br />

Through this period, the appropriateness <strong>of</strong> policy responses taken at Member State level were<br />

being weighed, as were the best courses <strong>of</strong> action for further interventions. The overall conclusion<br />

was to implement a coordinated framework based on a set <strong>of</strong> EU common principles to guide<br />

national decision-making regarding interventions. 5<br />

The key motivation for using <strong>state</strong> guarantees was to enhance the soundness <strong>and</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> the<br />

banking system, <strong>and</strong>, overall, to restore confidence <strong>and</strong> the proper functioning <strong>of</strong> wholesale<br />

funding markets.<br />

However, other considerations were also taken into account in the design <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees.<br />

Firstly, a distinction was made between financial institutions whose circumstances were due to<br />

general market conditions (<strong>of</strong> the nature described above) but were fundamentally sound <strong>and</strong><br />

those institutions whose pre-existing weaknesses were exposed through the financial crisis.<br />

Specifically, <strong>state</strong> guarantees were viewed as a suitable intervention for the former group <strong>of</strong> banks<br />

but not the latter.<br />

Secondly, there was also a preoccupation to ensure, to the extent possible, a level playing field<br />

between banks issuing <strong>state</strong> <strong>guaranteed</strong> <strong>bonds</strong> <strong>and</strong> other banks, <strong>and</strong> minimise any competition<br />

distortions that might arise from the granting <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees.<br />

Reflecting these points, <strong>state</strong> guarantees shifted from the provision <strong>of</strong> individual guarantees <strong>and</strong><br />

moved largely towards generalised schemes. This reflected the systemic scale <strong>of</strong> the problem <strong>and</strong><br />

the need for a system-wide solution. It also took into account the potential for fragmentation <strong>of</strong><br />

wholesale funding markets.<br />

Eligibility criteria codified, among other things, the requirement that only solvent banks could take<br />

up a <strong>state</strong> guarantee.<br />

More generally, the set-up <strong>of</strong> schemes with predominantly rules-based rather than discretionary<br />

access implied that banks could evaluate whether they wished to participate in <strong>state</strong> guarantee<br />

schemes or not. It was expected that transparent <strong>and</strong> fair access would help to minimise any<br />

potential negative competition.<br />

In addition to these specific principles relating to effectiveness, competition issues <strong>and</strong> market<br />

fragmentation, the general policy approach set out conditions specifying the circumstances in<br />

which <strong>state</strong> aid would be justified. Broadly, the criteria relate to the evaluation <strong>of</strong> whether there is<br />

a 'serious disturbance' that would have an immediate impact on the entire economy <strong>of</strong> a Member<br />

5 Among the key texts highlighting this process are Ec<strong>of</strong>in Council (2008) <strong>and</strong> European Commission (2008).<br />

15

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