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3 Issuing costs of state guaranteed bonds - Financial Risk and ...

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3 <strong>Issuing</strong> <strong>costs</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> <strong>guaranteed</strong> <strong>bonds</strong><br />

In general, the higher the actual issuing cost <strong>of</strong> a bond, the larger the impact <strong>of</strong> a <strong>state</strong> guarantee<br />

in reducing it. Specifically, bond issues in the 60-90th percentile have an issuing cost that is in the<br />

region <strong>of</strong> 100bps lower than without the <strong>state</strong> guarantee ceteris paribus.<br />

The distribution suggests, therefore, that <strong>state</strong> guarantees benefit the banks <strong>and</strong> bond issues that<br />

are regarded by investors as posing more credit risk. From a policy perspective, this finding is<br />

interesting in that <strong>state</strong> guarantees have the greatest impact (ins<strong>of</strong>ar as the reduction in issuing<br />

<strong>costs</strong> is largest) amongst the banks that had greatest difficulty in accessing wholesale funding.<br />

However, it must also be noted that at each issuing cost quantile, the impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees is<br />

heterogeneous. For instance, while the average impact in the 60-90 th percentile was<br />

approximately 100bps, the 95% upper <strong>and</strong> lower confident intervals were 160bps <strong>and</strong> 60bps,<br />

respectively.<br />

3.5.5 Impacts by guarantor<br />

The motivation for analysing impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees by guarantor relates to the concern that<br />

differences in the design <strong>of</strong> Member States' guarantee schemes caused the efficacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />

guarantees to vary across the European Union.<br />

Alternatively/in addition to this, it may be the case that differences in sovereign risk have been<br />

more important in determining the impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees than issue risk. This relates to the<br />

earlier discussion regarding the relationship between sovereign ratings <strong>and</strong> issuing <strong>costs</strong> in Section<br />

3.4. There we found that the relationship between sovereign ratings <strong>and</strong> issuing <strong>costs</strong> was<br />

stronger than the relationship between bond ratings <strong>and</strong> issuing <strong>costs</strong> (see Figure 14). Therefore,<br />

the st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong> the guarantor appeared to be more important than that <strong>of</strong> the bank in bond<br />

pricing. This observation is corroborated by existing literature that suggests that "strong" Member<br />

States have been propping up "weak" financial institutions (see Levy <strong>and</strong> Schich, 2010; <strong>and</strong> Panetta<br />

et al., 2009).<br />

The overarching concern is the effect <strong>state</strong> guarantees may have had on competition through<br />

financial market fragmentation. Namely, if banks are limited in their ability to access <strong>state</strong><br />

guarantees to a single or a subset <strong>of</strong> guarantors <strong>and</strong> the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> guarantees varies<br />

systematically by guarantor, we can conclude that financial markets have become relatively more<br />

fragmented than in the absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantee schemes.<br />

However, on balance the evidence does not suggest financial market fragmentation to any<br />

meaningful extent.<br />

We adopted the main empirical specification to test the hypothesis that <strong>state</strong> guarantees from<br />

particular guarantors had an effect on issuing <strong>costs</strong> additional to the effect expected by <strong>state</strong><br />

guarantees generally through differences in sovereign risk (captured by the sovereign CDS). 12 The<br />

estimation results <strong>of</strong> this issuing cost model show no statistically significant effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong><br />

guarantees from particular guarantors on issuing cost, as shown in column 2 <strong>of</strong> Table 8 (page 61).<br />

12 An interaction term between use <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantee (GUARANTEEi) <strong>and</strong> sovereign CDS (SOVit) was added to the main empirical<br />

specification. In addition to any effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>state</strong> guarantees on issuing cost that applies on average, the interaction term demarcates<br />

any additional effects due to the sovereign risk <strong>of</strong> particular guarantors.<br />

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