09.03.2014 Views

Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions

Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions

Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Banks’ Debt <strong>and</strong> Equity Exposure<br />

Debt. Low <strong>and</strong> declining sales volumes in domestic <strong>and</strong> export markets made it increasingly difficult for<br />

Indian steel companies to service their loans. The exposure of financial institutions in India due to<br />

aggressive lending practices in the early 1990s was already on average 12 percent of banks’ portfolios. 158<br />

Many of the new steel projects were not completed within stipulated time frames, forcing companies to take<br />

on additional debt.<br />

Equity Stakes. Major equity stakes in the steel sector increased many financial institutions’ exposure.<br />

Their stakes had originally accumulated due to the lack of public interest in the companies’ equity<br />

issuances. 159 Even though these banks have refused to finance additional steel projects, their existing equity<br />

stakes have compelled them to refinance the steel companies’ current debt. 160 To that end, the Industrial<br />

Development Bank of India promised that while no new projects will be approved in the near future, all<br />

plants currently in the pipeline will receive sufficient funding to be completed. 161 Since the Asian financial<br />

crisis, about $2 billion in additional financing has been sought. 162<br />

The ultimate effect of this assistance has been to increase company borrowing, even as company profits<br />

declined, resulting in growing debt to equity ratios (Chart 6-13).<br />

Import Surcharges. The government also lifted the surcharges levied on major steel inputs, forgoing tax<br />

revenue in an effort to reduce production costs for suffering Indian steel companies. 163<br />

1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999<br />

Profit D/E Profit D/E Profit D/E (%)<br />

(million R) (percent) (million R) (percent) (million R) (percent)<br />

SAIL 4.5 210 -5.3 230 -18.5 300<br />

TIS 11.3 100 8.5 110 2.1 130<br />

ESSAR 0.7 180 1.2 210 -24.9 290<br />

Source: CMA India.<br />

6-13. Profits <strong>and</strong> Debt-to-Equity Ratios of Three Indian <strong>Steel</strong> Producers<br />

SAIL Bailout<br />

The most telling example of recent direct government intervention is the restructuring package for<br />

government-owned SAIL. In February 2000, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved a<br />

package of approximately $2.2 billion for the company’s financial <strong>and</strong> business restructuring. While the<br />

financial package does not entail direct cash infusions, the government will provide SAIL with several<br />

valuable kinds of assistance:<br />

• A writeoff of about $1.14 billion in loans from the <strong>Steel</strong> Development Fund. 164<br />

• New government loans of about $86 million.<br />

• Loan guarantees for private sector loans totaling about $67 million.<br />

• Permission for SAIL to write off a $440 million loan advanced to its subsidiary, Indian Iron <strong>and</strong> <strong>Steel</strong><br />

Company, <strong>and</strong> waive $114 million in interest on loans to that subsidiary that were previously written<br />

off.<br />

• Guarantees for an additional $675 million in market financing; $337 million to finance SAIL’s<br />

voluntary retirement scheme, <strong>and</strong> $337 million to service its current-year debt burden. 165<br />

Chapter 6: New Players in the <strong>Global</strong> Market—India 167

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!