Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions
Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions
Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions
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Banks’ Debt <strong>and</strong> Equity Exposure<br />
Debt. Low <strong>and</strong> declining sales volumes in domestic <strong>and</strong> export markets made it increasingly difficult for<br />
Indian steel companies to service their loans. The exposure of financial institutions in India due to<br />
aggressive lending practices in the early 1990s was already on average 12 percent of banks’ portfolios. 158<br />
Many of the new steel projects were not completed within stipulated time frames, forcing companies to take<br />
on additional debt.<br />
Equity Stakes. Major equity stakes in the steel sector increased many financial institutions’ exposure.<br />
Their stakes had originally accumulated due to the lack of public interest in the companies’ equity<br />
issuances. 159 Even though these banks have refused to finance additional steel projects, their existing equity<br />
stakes have compelled them to refinance the steel companies’ current debt. 160 To that end, the Industrial<br />
Development Bank of India promised that while no new projects will be approved in the near future, all<br />
plants currently in the pipeline will receive sufficient funding to be completed. 161 Since the Asian financial<br />
crisis, about $2 billion in additional financing has been sought. 162<br />
The ultimate effect of this assistance has been to increase company borrowing, even as company profits<br />
declined, resulting in growing debt to equity ratios (Chart 6-13).<br />
Import Surcharges. The government also lifted the surcharges levied on major steel inputs, forgoing tax<br />
revenue in an effort to reduce production costs for suffering Indian steel companies. 163<br />
1996–1997 1997–1998 1998–1999<br />
Profit D/E Profit D/E Profit D/E (%)<br />
(million R) (percent) (million R) (percent) (million R) (percent)<br />
SAIL 4.5 210 -5.3 230 -18.5 300<br />
TIS 11.3 100 8.5 110 2.1 130<br />
ESSAR 0.7 180 1.2 210 -24.9 290<br />
Source: CMA India.<br />
6-13. Profits <strong>and</strong> Debt-to-Equity Ratios of Three Indian <strong>Steel</strong> Producers<br />
SAIL Bailout<br />
The most telling example of recent direct government intervention is the restructuring package for<br />
government-owned SAIL. In February 2000, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved a<br />
package of approximately $2.2 billion for the company’s financial <strong>and</strong> business restructuring. While the<br />
financial package does not entail direct cash infusions, the government will provide SAIL with several<br />
valuable kinds of assistance:<br />
• A writeoff of about $1.14 billion in loans from the <strong>Steel</strong> Development Fund. 164<br />
• New government loans of about $86 million.<br />
• Loan guarantees for private sector loans totaling about $67 million.<br />
• Permission for SAIL to write off a $440 million loan advanced to its subsidiary, Indian Iron <strong>and</strong> <strong>Steel</strong><br />
Company, <strong>and</strong> waive $114 million in interest on loans to that subsidiary that were previously written<br />
off.<br />
• Guarantees for an additional $675 million in market financing; $337 million to finance SAIL’s<br />
voluntary retirement scheme, <strong>and</strong> $337 million to service its current-year debt burden. 165<br />
Chapter 6: New Players in the <strong>Global</strong> Market—India 167