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Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions

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The Product Certification System<br />

Adding to the problem of finding a willing customer, a foreign producer must also wade through official<br />

Japanese certification requirements for steel—an often lengthy <strong>and</strong> frustrating process. Japanese Industrial<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard (JIS) certifications are national st<strong>and</strong>ards for industrial <strong>and</strong> mineral products. As a business<br />

reality in the steel industry, anyone wishing to sell in Japan must meet these st<strong>and</strong>ards. MITI h<strong>and</strong>les<br />

applications for JIS approval for foreign producers.<br />

The approval process for JIS certifications on trade with Japan has been a long-st<strong>and</strong>ing complaint among<br />

foreign producers trying to export to Japan. Given the international rules governing certifications <strong>and</strong><br />

Japan’s harmonization of its certification st<strong>and</strong>ards with those rules, 60 in theory it should be as easy for a<br />

foreign producer to get JIS approval as it is for a domestic producer. But according to U.S. mills who have<br />

been through the process, acquiring JIS approval has not been easy.<br />

While the Japanese government has maintained in recent bilateral discussions with the United States that<br />

any such problems are out-of-date, discussions with steel producers for this report suggest that the<br />

certification process continues to serve as an impediment to imports.<br />

One recent complaint relayed by a U.S. producer involved JIS approval. According to company officials,<br />

the producer was granted approval on its first mill only because the mill manufactured a product that was<br />

considered unlikely to be exported to Japan. Even so, the approval process took one year. When the<br />

company built an additional facility that manufactured products more likely to be exported to Japan, MITI<br />

indicated that the company would have to reapply for JIS certification for that facility. Despite already<br />

having JIS certification for its first mill, approval for the additional facility took twice as long. According<br />

to U.S. company officials, the product manufactured at the additional facility was considered a threat to the<br />

Japanese domestic market <strong>and</strong> for this reason, JIS approval was delayed. 61<br />

Apparent Arrangements Between Japanese Producers<br />

<strong>and</strong> EU <strong>and</strong> Korean Producers<br />

For many years, U.S. steel producers <strong>and</strong> others have claimed that Japanese producers have entered into<br />

informal arrangements with certain foreign producers to limit access to each others’ markets. The best known<br />

of these alleged arrangements is the “East of Burma” Agreement, between Japanese <strong>and</strong> European mills.<br />

While the existence of these arrangements is routinely denied by both Japanese steel producers <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Japanese government, 62 there is information that market-sharing arrangements have existed between the<br />

Japanese <strong>and</strong> the EU steelmakers well into the 1990s. In a 1999 decision, the European Commission found<br />

that major Japanese <strong>and</strong> European steelmakers had engaged in cartel activity for the sale of seamless pipe.<br />

The finding covered an arrangement among four major Japanese producers, including Nippon <strong>Steel</strong>, <strong>and</strong> four<br />

European counterparts, to restrict sales in each others’ markets from 1990 through 1995. As reported by the<br />

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “What the EU sees as problematic in this case is [the eight steelmakers] dividing up<br />

of the market. The British, French, German, Italian <strong>and</strong> Japanese manufacturers conspired to refrain from<br />

selling in each others’ national markets. They are said to have split up Europe, which is supposed to be a<br />

single market, <strong>and</strong> restricted competition.” 63 In addition to this formal cartel finding, there is also substantial<br />

anecdotal evidence from traders that quotas continue in force.<br />

• One trader has stated that “the Japanese will not sell into Europe’s market for fear that the European<br />

mills will sell directly into the Japanese domestic market in return.” 64<br />

• Another trader, in a November 1999 response to a sales inquiry, stated that the “Gentlemen’s agreement<br />

between EU-Japan/Korean mills are still effective, but even under the agreement nominal tonnage can<br />

be allowed.” 65<br />

Chapter 3: Behind the Crisis—Japan 77

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