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Global Steel Trade; Structural Problems and Future Solutions

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Trillions of Rubles<br />

8<br />

7<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0<br />

200%<br />

150%<br />

100%<br />

50%<br />

0%<br />

ZapSib<br />

Source: Ekspert.<br />

Nizhny<br />

Tagil<br />

1995 1996 1997 1998<br />

Mechel Nosta Kuznetsk Oskol<br />

3-10. Payables to Suppliers, Mid-Sized Companies<br />

ZapSib<br />

Source: Ekspert.<br />

Nizhny<br />

Tagil<br />

1995 1996 1997 1998<br />

Mechel Nosta Kuznetsk Oskol<br />

3-11. Payables to Suppliers as Percent of Net Sales,<br />

Mid-Sized Companies<br />

The suppliers of raw materials<br />

<strong>and</strong> energy tolerated this<br />

situation for the same reason<br />

they complied with governmentimposed<br />

low prices on their<br />

products <strong>and</strong> services: they<br />

were supported by the<br />

government or had export<br />

privileges. Additionally,<br />

suppliers, such as the regional<br />

electric companies, were often<br />

dependent upon local industries<br />

as their only source of cash,<br />

fuel, <strong>and</strong> other goods needed to<br />

remain in operation, <strong>and</strong> “have<br />

little incentive to take an<br />

adversarial approach.” 104<br />

Government Taxes. Taxes<br />

have also gone unpaid. At the<br />

end of 1998, according to one<br />

analysis, Russian iron <strong>and</strong> steel<br />

companies owed the<br />

government roughly $836<br />

million in taxes. 105 Moreover,<br />

the amount of taxes a company<br />

paid was essentially negotiable.<br />

The McKinsey study makes the<br />

point that the nominal tax<br />

burden in Russia is 55–60<br />

percent of GDP, while planned<br />

revenues are 35 percent <strong>and</strong><br />

actual cash revenues are<br />

approximately 20 percent. The<br />

difference between what was<br />

supposed to be collected <strong>and</strong><br />

what was actually collected in<br />

cash left a lot of room for<br />

unequal tax payments among<br />

companies. 106<br />

The fact that tax arrears grew while production increased sheds light on the unique economic environment<br />

in which Russian steel companies operated. In the words of one analyst, “the state’s systematic failure to<br />

force large enterprises to pay [their taxes] amounts to a massive subsidy to those powerful or resourceful<br />

enough to negotiate amnesties <strong>and</strong> settlements.” 107<br />

• From 1992 to 1995, Magnitogorsk built-up a substantial tax liability to the federal government. In<br />

1996, Magnitogorsk—apparently along with much of the rest of the industry—was so far behind in its<br />

taxes that bankruptcy proceedings were threatened. 108 After negotiations with the government, the<br />

company was allowed to pay what it owed over several years at a “very, very low” interest rate. 109<br />

While Magnitogorsk was eventually able to pay off its tax debt, after the ruble depreciation made<br />

54 <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Steel</strong> <strong>Trade</strong>: <strong>Structural</strong> <strong>Problems</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Future</strong> <strong>Solutions</strong>

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