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The Energy Regulation and Markets Review - Stikeman Elliott

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United States<br />

sought <strong>and</strong> the investment being made. FERC currently is considering potential changes<br />

to the scope <strong>and</strong> implementation of its transmission incentives regulations <strong>and</strong> policies.<br />

Since 2000, FERC has permitted certain merchant transmission projects to<br />

charge negotiated rates for transmission service under OATT-based transmission service<br />

agreements. Initially, FERC required merchant transmission facilities to hold open<br />

seasons for the full capacity of a planned project. Since 2009, FERC has permitted certain<br />

merchant transmission project developers to allow ‘anchor customers’ to pre-subscribe<br />

some percentage (to date, typically not more than 50 per cent) of the capacity of a<br />

proposed project through long-term transmission service agreements that can provide<br />

for up-front payments by the anchor customer to facilitate project construction. <strong>The</strong><br />

remaining project capacity not committed to anchor customers will be made available<br />

to later customers selected through an open season process detailed in the project’s<br />

OATT <strong>and</strong> these customers will be entitled to obtain service under terms <strong>and</strong> conditions<br />

generally comparable to those available to anchor customers. FERC is currently<br />

considering potential reforms to its policies concerning the allocation of capacity on new<br />

merchant transmission projects <strong>and</strong> new cost-based, participant-funded transmission<br />

projects (that historically have not been subject to open season or other OATT-based<br />

open access requirements).<br />

iii Security <strong>and</strong> technology restrictions<br />

Prior to 2005, the United States relied on voluntary compliance by participants in the<br />

bulk power industry with reliability requirements for operating <strong>and</strong> planning the bulk<br />

power system coordinated through the North American Electric Reliability Corporation<br />

(‘NERC’) <strong>and</strong> various related regional entities. In 2005, Congress responded to the<br />

previously mentioned August 2003 blackout by amending the FPA to provide for a<br />

system of m<strong>and</strong>atory, enforceable reliability st<strong>and</strong>ards to be developed by a FERCcertified<br />

‘electric reliability organisation’ or ‘ERO’, subject to review <strong>and</strong> approval by<br />

FERC. For purposes of approving <strong>and</strong> enforcing compliance with reliability st<strong>and</strong>ards,<br />

FERC has jurisdiction over the FERC-certified ERO, any regional reliability entities,<br />

<strong>and</strong> all users, owners <strong>and</strong> operators of the bulk power system, including public <strong>and</strong><br />

governmental entities not otherwise subject to FERC jurisdiction under the FPA. FERC<br />

certified NERC as the ERO <strong>and</strong> in various subsequent orders has defined the bulk power<br />

system <strong>and</strong> approved a number of reliability st<strong>and</strong>ards proposed by NERC.<br />

IV<br />

ENERGY MARKETS<br />

i Development of energy markets<br />

Throughout certain regions in the United States, ISOs <strong>and</strong> regional transmission<br />

organisations (‘RTOs’) operate transmission facilities <strong>and</strong> administer energy markets.<br />

FERC has prohibited any one set of market participants (including transmission<br />

owners) from controlling decision making within an ISO or RTO. FERC’s Order No.<br />

2000 imposed significant regulatory requirements upon ISOs <strong>and</strong> RTOs regarding the<br />

independence of an energy market administrator, the performance of the energy markets<br />

<strong>and</strong> the elimination of discrimination. FERC left considerable discretion to market<br />

338

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