Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

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PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER 1 K hp 2 K hp i K hp 11 K pa m K pa 1 - 118 - 12 K pa Khm Figure 6.3 An overview of trust associations for fast authentication The trust association between a FAP and each associated AN is enabled using a pairwise key pa K . The pairwise key K pa is mutually agreed upon by the owner of the FAP and the operator of the AN. By doing do, an AN can confirm that a FAP is legitimate for authenticating a certain group of mobile users. As an independent authority for taking authentication requests, a FAP may be associated with many access networks for fast authentication as shown in Figure 6.3. Meanwhile, an access network can establish trust associations with different FAPs through shared keys at the same time, since the mobile users with different realm portions of Network Access Identifiers (NAI) [64] may require different AAA routing paths. The case of an AN being associated with multiple FAPs has not been shown in Figure 6.3 for the sake of simplicity. The explicit trust association between a mobile user MH and its HAAA can be established through another key K hm. Table 6.1 lists all the related keys for the PBAL trust association model for fast authentication. The three pre-established keys K hp , K pa ,
PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER K hm are used to build the two types of explicit trust associations required in the handover attachment. Although their updates can be agreed upon by the involved parties, these keys are mostly regarded as “permanent” in contrast to the two derived temporary keys: Local Authentication Key (LAK) and Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The LAK is a session-related key generated by the HAAA. It is employed by the FAP to perform mutual authentication with the MH and establish the necessary security context associated with the AN. The LAK is used to derive the PMK, which is specified in IEEE 802.11i [42] for wireless link protection. Table 6.1 A list of the PBAL trust association model related keys Abbr. Description Temporary key K hp Pairwise key shared between HAAA and FAP N K pa Pairwise key shared between FAP and AN N K hm Pre-Shared Key (PSK) between HAAA and MH N LAK Local authentication key shared among HAAA, FAP and MH Y PMK Pairwise master key shared among FAP, AN and MH Y 6.3.2 Fast Authentication Ticket Generation Method After completing the attachment to a network, the MH can request a Fast Authentication Ticket (FAT) for every nearby access network from its HAAA. The nearby access networks can be either pre-determined using the pre-stored network location information, or determined using the network trust information retrieval scheme presented in Chapter 4. The location based approach requires that a network has accurate location information of its neighbouring networks. Since all the location data have to be pre-loaded, this approach is static and can not cope with changes to networks. With the method proposed in Chapter 4, the serving Access Network (sAN) that has obtained its neighbour network trust pattern can provide the MH’s HAAA with an identifier list of its neighbouring access networks. Note that the determination of the access networks in vicinity is outside the scope of this discussion. It is assumed here that the sAN has the knowledge of its surrounding access - 119 -
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Handover Mechanisms in Next Generat
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT First of all, I woul
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4.2 Power Save
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LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES Fig
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 7.2 A generi
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ABSTRACT New access technologies su
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION New access t
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INTRODUCTION becomes available. Han
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INTRODUCTION The above multipliciti
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INTRODUCTION network trust pattern
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INTRODUCTION 1.3 Related Publicatio
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INTRODUCTION TECHNICAL REPORTS XIII
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT horizontally. H
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The objective o
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT air interface,
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT proposed archit
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT Access point (A
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT users. Moreover
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT For IEEE 802.11
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The two schemes
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT When a MH is mo
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3.1 Introduction Chapter 3 HANDOVER
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SECURITY FOR HANDOVER ACROSS HETERO
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DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
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Page 79 and 80: DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
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Page 95 and 96: TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER ALGORITHM F
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Page 125 and 126: PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISA
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Page 147 and 148: MULTI-INTERFACE MOBILE MODEL FOR ME
Page 169 and 170: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH WOR
Page 175 and 176: ABBREVIATIONS 3G 3rd Generation Wir
Page 177 and 178: ABBREVIATIONS LS Location Server MH
Page 179 and 180: ABBREVIATIONS THOA Trust Assisted H
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REFERENCES [12] C. Politis, T. Oda,
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REFERENCES [37] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi
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REFERENCES presented at IEEE Intern
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REFERENCES [90] R. Verdone and A. Z
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REFERENCES [116] K. E. Malki and H.
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