Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

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PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER E LAK E ( Nm || N s || N p ) LAK ( MAC || N p ) - 124 - EK pa EK pa EK pa Figure 6.5 Fast authentication procedure ( FAT, SQN) { ELAK ( Nm || N s || N p )} { ELAK ( MAC || N p )} EK (PMK) pa As shown in Figure 6.5, the FAP verifies whether the computed identity ID p is equal to its real identity such that the identity of the MH’s HAAA can be verified. If it passes verification, the FAP issues a proxy nonce N p , which will contribute to the generation of a new PMK. With all the credentials from the FAT, the FAP encrypts the nounces N m , s N and N p that go as a challenge using the LAK, and returns the
PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ) in a Fast Authentication Response to the MH. The MH can compute the LAK using Equation 6.3 based on its knowledge of the required credentials. After receiving the fast authentication response from the FAP, the MH is able to decrypt E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ) with the LAK computed by itself. The N m obtained should be the same as the original one issued previously for requesting the FAT. By doing so, the MH verifies the authenticity of the visited network nAN. After verifying the nAN’s identity, the MH gets itself authenticated to the nAN. The MH uses the challenge s N provided by its HAAA, K hm , ID m , ID s , and N m to compute a MAC value using Equation 6.4. The MAC along with N p are encrypted in E LAK ( MAC || N p ) and delivered to the FAP as a challenge response. With decryption, the FAP verifies the MH’s identity by comparing the received MAC with the XMAC provided by the HAAA. If they are equal, the following PMK is generated, and sent to the nAN to build the necessary security context. PMK � prf ( LAK , N m || N s || N p ) (Equation 6.6) A fast authentication response is returned to the MH to notify the authentication result. Then, the MH can build the corresponding PMK for communications with the nAN. 6.3.4 Session Key Renewal In the PBAL, a session key renewal method is proposed so that a mobile user may renew its session key (PMK) that is used to protect the wireless link according to IEEE 802.11i [42]. Change of session key would reduce the risk that the mobile user uses a compromised session key to communicate with an access network. In the PBAL session key renewal method, the session key renewal can be initiated by either the sAN or the MH. Figure 6.6 shows how the session key PMK being shared between the MH and the sAN can be renewed as requested by the MH. The MH generates a new mobile nonce N m ', and sends a Key Renew Request including this new nonce N m ' along with the original server nonce N s (previously issued by the HAAA) to the FAP to initiate the session key renewal process. N m ' and N s are encrypted with - 125 -
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Handover Mechanisms in Next Generat
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT First of all, I woul
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4.2 Power Save
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LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES Fig
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 7.2 A generi
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ABSTRACT New access technologies su
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION New access t
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INTRODUCTION becomes available. Han
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INTRODUCTION The above multipliciti
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INTRODUCTION network trust pattern
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INTRODUCTION 1.3 Related Publicatio
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INTRODUCTION TECHNICAL REPORTS XIII
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT horizontally. H
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The objective o
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT air interface,
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT proposed archit
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT Access point (A
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT users. Moreover
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT For IEEE 802.11
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The two schemes
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT When a MH is mo
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3.1 Introduction Chapter 3 HANDOVER
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SECURITY FOR HANDOVER ACROSS HETERO
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DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
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Page 85 and 86: DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
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Page 95 and 96: TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER ALGORITHM F
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Page 175 and 176: ABBREVIATIONS 3G 3rd Generation Wir
Page 177 and 178: ABBREVIATIONS LS Location Server MH
Page 179 and 180: ABBREVIATIONS THOA Trust Assisted H
Page 181 and 182: REFERENCES [12] C. Politis, T. Oda,
Page 183 and 184: REFERENCES [37] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi
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REFERENCES [90] R. Verdone and A. Z
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REFERENCES [116] K. E. Malki and H.
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