Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER specified in 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol [93]. However, instead of explicitly requesting authentication vectors from the home network, the FAP obtains security credentials through the fast authentication ticket FAT presented by the mobile user. The release of the FAT by the party who makes handover decision can ensure that sensitive security information can only be disclosed to the selected network. In this section, the security of the PBAL is analysed. First, it shows how mutual authentication in a handover is provided. Then, the study analyses the security of the proposed scheme against some known attacks such as replay attack. 6.4.1 Mutual Authentication The PBAL provides mutual authentication between a mobile user and FAP. The MH sends a fast authentication request enclosing the related FAT for local authentication at the FAP upon attaching to the selected network. With decryption, the FAP extracts m N from FAT( IDm , N s , PID p , SQN, LAK, MAC) , and encloses it in E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ) sent to the MH. Since N m was originally issued by the MH and is only known to its home AAA server, only the party that has a trust relationship ( K hp ) with the home AAA server can demonstrate it. Thus, by checking the correctness of N m , the MH can verify whether the FAP is a representative of its home AAA server and has been authorised for local authentication. To get itself authenticated by the FAP, the MH computes the MAC, which is a function of K hm , m N , s N . m N and N s are two random numbers, which are chosen by the MH and its home AAA server respectively. The N s encrypted in ) || || ( E LAK N m N s N p was previously sent by the FAP as a challenge. Before being able to retrieve N s from E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ) , the MH must correctly compute the local authentication key LAK that is a function of the preshared key K hm and the pairwise master key PMK associated with the serving AN. With decryption, the MH gets s N , and computes the MAC m using its message authentication function f according to Equation 6.4. By comparing MAC m with MAC h that is provided by the home AAA server, the FAP verifies whether the MH is a legitimate subscriber of the home AAA server. - 128 -
PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER 6.4.2 Security against Replay Attack Replay attack involves the capture of over the air information and the subsequent retransmission to trick the receiver into unauthorised operations. During the fast authentication procedure of the PBAL, fast authentication requests/responses are exchanged between the MH and the AN via unprotected wireless link before the PMK is established (shown in Figure 6.5). These messages are at risk of being eavesdropped by an adversary. The adversary may mock up a fast authentication request with the same FAT and send it later to gain the right of using the AN. However, such an attempt can be effectively prevented in the PBAL. Assume that two messages: “FA Request (with FAT)” and “FA Challenge Response” have been eavesdropped by an adversary, when a MH was attempting to attach to the new AN (nAN). The adversary can impersonate the MH, and try to establish a connection with the nAN. To impersonate the MH, the adversary sends the copied FA Request (with the identical FAT) to the nAN, and waits for the challenge from the FAP for further verification. According to the fast authentication procedure of Figure 6.5, the FAP returns a FA challenge E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ' ) to the adversary. N ' is a random number generated by the FAP every time it receives a FA request. Obviously, the newly generated N p ' is different from the N p of the previous session that has been captured by the adversary. The adversary will fail the identity verification at the FAP with the expired N p . Therefore, using the old credential - 129 - E LAK ( MAC || N p ) as the FA challenge response can not pass the verification on N p ' to be conducted at the FAP. In another case, an adversary may impersonate the nAN, and fool the MH to attach to the adversary. Assume that the adversary entices the MH to attach to it soon after eavesdropping the FA challenge E LAK ( N m || N s || N p ) previously sent by the nAN. Such a replay attack can be easily avoided in the PBAL. The MH required both the correct LAK and N m for performing the FAP’s identity verification. The LAK is a function of the session key PMK, while N m is a random number that is valid for a specific FAT. The MH produces a new N m ' for retrieving the FAT after every successful handover. When the MH receives the concocted fast authentication challenge p
Page 1 and 2:
Handover Mechanisms in Next Generat
Page 3 and 4:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT First of all, I woul
Page 5 and 6:
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4.2 Power Save
Page 7 and 8:
LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES Fig
Page 9 and 10:
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 7.2 A generi
Page 11 and 12:
ABSTRACT New access technologies su
Page 13 and 14:
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION New access t
Page 15 and 16:
INTRODUCTION becomes available. Han
Page 17 and 18:
INTRODUCTION The above multipliciti
Page 19 and 20:
INTRODUCTION network trust pattern
Page 21 and 22:
INTRODUCTION 1.3 Related Publicatio
Page 23 and 24:
INTRODUCTION TECHNICAL REPORTS XIII
Page 25 and 26:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT horizontally. H
Page 27 and 28:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The objective o
Page 29 and 30:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT air interface,
Page 31 and 32:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT proposed archit
Page 33 and 34:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT Access point (A
Page 35 and 36:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT users. Moreover
Page 37 and 38:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT For IEEE 802.11
Page 39 and 40:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The two schemes
Page 41 and 42:
HANDOVER MANAGEMENT When a MH is mo
Page 43 and 44:
3.1 Introduction Chapter 3 HANDOVER
Page 45 and 46:
SECURITY FOR HANDOVER ACROSS HETERO
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90: DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
Page 91 and 92: DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 5 TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER A
Page 95 and 96: TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER ALGORITHM F
Page 123 and 124: Chapter 6 PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATIO
Page 125 and 126: PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISA
Page 139: PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISA
Page 147 and 148: MULTI-INTERFACE MOBILE MODEL FOR ME
Page 169 and 170: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH WOR
Page 175 and 176: ABBREVIATIONS 3G 3rd Generation Wir
Page 177 and 178: ABBREVIATIONS LS Location Server MH
Page 179 and 180: ABBREVIATIONS THOA Trust Assisted H
Page 181 and 182: REFERENCES [12] C. Politis, T. Oda,
Page 183 and 184: REFERENCES [37] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi
Page 185 and 186: REFERENCES presented at IEEE Intern
Page 187 and 188: REFERENCES [90] R. Verdone and A. Z
Page 189: REFERENCES [116] K. E. Malki and H.
show all

Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?