Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

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PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER where f is a message authentication function that is only known to the MH and its HAAA. The HAAA encrypts the FAT contents as listed in Equation 6.1 using the secret key K hp shared with the corresponding FAP. After every AN on the neighbour access network list has been produced a FAT, the HAAA builds up an encrypted FAT Vector (FATV): EK hm ( FATV[ FAT , IDp1, FAT2 , IDp 2 ,..., FATt , ID 1 pt which includes every FAT and the corresponding FAP’s identity ID p . The FATV is protected by the key K hm shared between the MH and its HAAA. Then, the encrypted FATV is included in a FAT Response message, and sent back to the MH as shown in Figure 6.4. The encryption using the PSK K hm makes sure that the FATV would not be disclosed to other parties (including the sAN), and only the MH can view it. Although the MH can decrypt the encrypted FATV, it is unable to learn the contents of individual FAP. Each FAT is encrypted with a key ( K hp ) that is only known to the HAAA and the FAP that it is generated for. Neither the MH nor the sAN can modify the received FAT’s contents. Once the FAT response is received, the MH increments its SQN m counter by 1. MH sAN HAAA FAT Request EK hm FAT Response FATV [ FAT , ID , FAT , ID Initial full authentication via sAN ( Nm ) EK hm - 122 - ( Nm ) , ]) FAT Request NAN ,..., �AN , AN AN � _ IDs 1 2 FAT Response FATV [ FAT , ID , FAT , ID , ..., FAT , ID EK ( hm 1 p1 2 p2 t p3 , ..., FAT , ID EK ( h 1 p1 2 p2 t p3 Figure 6.4 Fast authentication ticket generation procedure The consequence of the fast authentication ticket generation is that a FAT will be produced for every nearby access network before a handover execution. Note that only ]) t ])
PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISATION SCHEME FOR HANDOVER the FAT for the selected access network (determined by the handover decision algorithm in the mobile terminal) would be used by the MH for fast authentication. 6.3.3 Fast Authentication Method To handover to a new Access Network (nAN), the MH sends out a Fast Authentication Request including the corresponding FAT and its SQN m to the nAN for requesting local authentication. The MH can influence the AAA routing by modifying the realm portion of its identity [64]. The new identity realm portion can be determined according to the identity ID p of the FAP associated with the nAN. As a result, the fast authentication request can be redirected to the specified FAP instead of the HAAA. If the modification of the realm portion is not supported by the AAA protocol, the MH may provide the nAN with the FAP’s identity ID p so that the nAN can route the authentication request accordingly. The FAP decrypts the received FAT ( ID , N , PID , SQN , LAK , MAC) - 123 - EK hp m s p using the key K hp shared with the MH’s HAAA and retrieves its contents. However, further operations will proceed only if the FAT’s SQN is equal to the SQN m provided by the MH. Next, the FAP uses Equation 6.5 to derive its identity from the pseudo one PID p provided by the HAAA: ID � PID � h( K || N ) � N (Equation 6.5) p p hp s s
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Handover Mechanisms in Next Generat
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT First of all, I woul
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 4.4.2 Power Save
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LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF FIGURES Fig
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LIST OF FIGURES Figure 7.2 A generi
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ABSTRACT New access technologies su
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION New access t
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INTRODUCTION becomes available. Han
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INTRODUCTION The above multipliciti
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INTRODUCTION network trust pattern
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INTRODUCTION 1.3 Related Publicatio
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INTRODUCTION TECHNICAL REPORTS XIII
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT horizontally. H
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The objective o
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT air interface,
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT proposed archit
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT Access point (A
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT users. Moreover
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT For IEEE 802.11
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT The two schemes
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HANDOVER MANAGEMENT When a MH is mo
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3.1 Introduction Chapter 3 HANDOVER
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SECURITY FOR HANDOVER ACROSS HETERO
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DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
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Page 83 and 84: DYNAMIC NEIGHBOUR TRUST INFORMATION
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 5 TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER A
Page 95 and 96: TRUST ASSISTED HANDOVER ALGORITHM F
Page 123 and 124: Chapter 6 PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATIO
Page 125 and 126: PROXY BASED AUTHENTICATION LOCALISA
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Page 147 and 148: MULTI-INTERFACE MOBILE MODEL FOR ME
Page 169 and 170: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH WOR
Page 175 and 176: ABBREVIATIONS 3G 3rd Generation Wir
Page 177 and 178: ABBREVIATIONS LS Location Server MH
Page 179 and 180: ABBREVIATIONS THOA Trust Assisted H
Page 181 and 182: REFERENCES [12] C. Politis, T. Oda,
Page 183 and 184: REFERENCES [37] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Wi
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REFERENCES presented at IEEE Intern
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REFERENCES [90] R. Verdone and A. Z
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REFERENCES [116] K. E. Malki and H.
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