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Handover mechanisms in next generation heterogeneous wireless ...

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SECURITY FOR HANDOVER ACROSS HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS NETWORKS<br />

authenticator PAE exchanges 802.1X messages with the supplicant PAE through the<br />

uncontrolled port before the supplicant is authenticated. The exchange of data traffic is<br />

allowed through the controlled port after the supplicant is authenticated successfully.<br />

The 802.1X utilises Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [18] to provide a variety<br />

of authentication <strong>mechanisms</strong>. The EAP does not have an address<strong>in</strong>g mechanism and<br />

has its messages encapsulated over EAP Over LAN (EAPOL) protocol between the<br />

supplicant and the authenticator.<br />

The 802.11i def<strong>in</strong>es two classes of security algorithms for IEEE 802.11 networks:<br />

Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) and pre-RSNA. A Robust Security<br />

Network (RSN) is a security network that allows the creation of robust security network<br />

associations, RSNAs, between all stations [48]. The RSNA security comprises two<br />

security algorithms: IEEE 802.11 entity authentication and WEP. The 802.11i standard<br />

suggests that pre-RSNA methods that have already been <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> IEEE 802.11 [46]<br />

will be implemented to aid migration to RSNA methods. The key management def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

for RSNA authentication will be presented here for further elaboration on the enhanced<br />

authentication mechanism <strong>in</strong> 802.11 WLAN.<br />

When the IEEE 802.1X authentication is used, the supplicant PAE <strong>in</strong>itiates the<br />

authentication to the authenticator by send<strong>in</strong>g an EAPOL-Start message to the<br />

authenticator. As shown <strong>in</strong> Figure 3.3, the authenticator replies with an EAP-<br />

Request/Identity to obta<strong>in</strong> the user’s identity. The user then sends back an EAP-<br />

Response/Identity conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its identity <strong>in</strong> response to the received EAP identity<br />

request. Upon receiv<strong>in</strong>g the EAP Response, the authentication PAE needs to deliver the<br />

EAP response message to the authentication server. The communications for<br />

authentication between the authenticator and the authentication server can be achieved<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g the AAA protocols like Remote Access Dial In User Service (RADIUS, RFC<br />

2865 [49]). The authenticator encapsulates the EAP-Response/Identity message <strong>in</strong> a<br />

RADIUS Access-Request message, and sends it to the RADIUS authentication server.<br />

Multi-round authentication message exchanges will be needed to verify the identities of<br />

both EAP entities (the supplicant and the authentication server as shown <strong>in</strong> Figure 3.3).<br />

The verification can be carried out by means of Extensible Authentication Protocol-<br />

Transport Level Security (EAP-TLS, RFC 2716 [50]) protocol, which is outside the<br />

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