Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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Shaky ground: Ethiopian water policy making and Nile Basin cooperation highlight trade-offs between different domestic and international water development strategies. Current efforts to enhance the coordination between donor agencies in Ethiopia, i.e., through the Development Assistance Group (DAG), are expected to have a positive effect on the integration and coherence of different sectoral policies. Donor networks act as one of the few water policy think-tanks to complement the governmental water policy process. In their role as ‘information brokers’, donor agencies contribute to reducing uncertainties and support the search for sustainable, domestically agreeable, and internationally compatible strategies. In sum, donor agencies exercise influence on the Ethiopian win-set by 1) selectively supporting certain projects, 2) strengthening the national planning and project implementation capacity, 3) pressing for more stakeholder participation and environmental protection, and 4) leveling information asymmetries. Donors are likely to shift the national win-set towards internationally compatible strategies, i.e., ‘win-win’ projects and less consumptive water uses, both by not supporting ‘hawkish’ strategies and by supporting initiatives for transboundary policy coordination and joint planning. Participation of non-governmental actors The extent of stakeholder participation has somewhat expanded with the adoption of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles. However, the overall patterns of stakeholders involvement remain rather fragmentary and vary across different phases of the planning process. While different stakeholders were consulted in the formulation of the water policy documents, important decisions regarding national development targets and the prioritization of projects are usually made in a top-down manner. The lack of stakeholder participation is exacerbated by weak information flows between and within different actor categories. The government exploits information asymmetries in order to bypass the potential opposition of domestic actors in the design of both domestic and transboundary projects. Research institutions, NGOs, and donor agencies as domestic information brokers have a somewhat balancing effect in this regard. 145
<strong>Double</strong>-<strong>Edged</strong> <strong>Hydropolitics</strong> on the Nile The limited exploitation of non-governmental expertise potentially constrains the government’s ability to design and implement effective and broadly accepted water development strategies. Incomplete knowledge regarding the overall costs and benefits of different policy options, e.g., small-scale irrigation and rainwater harvesting vs. large-scale infrastructure projects (see Awulachew et al. 2005), yields an unclear picture of the relative utility of different basin-wide cooperation scenarios. An increased involvement of NGOs, research organizations and local water user groups would not only strengthen the effectiveness of water management approaches at the domestic level, but also enhance the government’s ability to evaluate trade-offs between different water policy options at the basin level more comprehensively. 5.5 Synthesis and conclusions The inter-relatedness of de jure quota allocation issues and joint water development projects makes the two-level game in the Nile Basin particularly complex. Policy preferences diverge along several dimensions, rendering the delineation of a specific win-set very difficult. This is all the more true as the range of joint river development scenarios is not a priori known, but is currently explored by the basin states themselves. The Ethiopian win-set in the context of the Nile Basin negotiations is constrained both by challenges to the government’s planning autonomy, and by the limited capacity of water policy makers at different levels to design and evaluate innovative domestic and cooperative water management strategies. Obviously, these are two fundamentally different mechanisms influencing the win-set with different implications on the potential outcome of the transboundary negotiations. A high degree of decision autonomy on the part of the government generally has a broadening effect on the win-set. A powerful government, or chief negotiator, can more easily amend national policies for the sake of basin-wide cooperation, and can more easily ignore critical voices among 146
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Samuel Luzi Double
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Acknowledgment T his study was cond
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Acknowledgement Furthermore, I am g
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Table of Contents List of Figures 1
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Table of Contents 4.8 Patterns of p
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List of Figures 1.1 Converging anal
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List of Abbreviations AAU ADB ADLI
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List of Abbreviations R&D Research
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1 Introduction T he growing global
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Introduction 1.1 Research questions
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Introduction The analytical perspec
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Introduction concepts with regard t
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Introduction and Ashton 2004). Gene
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Introduction Causes, characteristic
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Introduction different tracks: 1) i
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Introduction management agreements
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Introduction While most of these st
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Introduction is defined as a state
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Introduction a) Country B Country A
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Introduction particularly stress th
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Introduction The notion of policy n
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Introduction studies. A short compa
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Introduction Closely related minist
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Introduction 1.6 Outline of the the
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3 International River Basins: Manag
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4 Driving forces and patterns of wa
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Appendix Questionnaires used in the
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Appendix • Please try to give you
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Appendix 2 Official Affiliation Wit
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation Wi
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Appendix Instructions All the follo
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Appendix MOWR Department of Rural W
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Appendix 2 Meetings With which of t
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation 5A
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