Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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Concluding Remarks These insights illustrate the complexity of the process of designing and implementing a cooperative regime in the Nile Basin, and the importance of the domestic institutional dimension underlying the transboundary negotiation processes. The applicability of the results from the Nile Basin to other transboundary watersheds, however, is limited due to the great diversity of specific water management challenges and politico-economic contexts in different basins. For instance, transboundary cooperation efforts in the context of water quality disputes in wealthy Western states can be expected to have quite different domestic underpinnings as compared to water sharing conflicts in arid basins among riparian countries relying on subsistence agriculture. Nevertheless, the following general conclusions with regard to the inter-actions between domestic and international water policy processes can be derived: • As noted by Evans et al. (1993) and Milner (1997), the impact of domestic-level factors in a two-level game perspective significantly depends on the policy issue at stake. The issue of transboundary river management can be expected to draw the attention of a particularly high number and diversity of domestic actors because of 1) the intersectoral nature of water management challenges, 2) the diversity of livelihoods depending on various water services, 3) the high stakes, at least in arid regions, for the agricultural sector, which commonly employs a significant part of the population and /or is politically influential, 4) the environmental and social dimensions of water management that are highlighted by many non-governmental and external actors (e.g., donor agencies), and 5) the emotional connotations attached to different water uses in addition to their economic significance. Reforms of national water policies for the sake of transboundary cooperation are thus likely to face intense domestic scrutiny. • Domestic actors in countries that critically depend on the inflow of river water and experience substantial internal competition for scarce water resources are more likely to stand united behind their government’s claim for higher water quotas in the transboundary context. This narrows the win-set towards a more hawkish position and can serve as a bargaining advantage of the respective chief negotiator. 219
<strong>Double</strong>-<strong>Edged</strong> <strong>Hydropolitics</strong> on the Nile • The inter-sectoral nature of water policy challenges often creates interministerial conflicts of interest. The assumption of a unified executive branch, as it is often applied in formal two-level game models, is therefore highly questionable in the context of transboundary cooperation regarding water resources management. • Domestic constraints on the reform of water policies generally work in favor of countries that are privileged under the present conditions and benefit from a continuation of the status quo. • The pressure on the river is highest when riparian states are domestically constrained to implement ‘dovish’ policies (i.e., to reduce their demand), but unconstrained to implement ‘hawkish’ strategies (i.e., to increase river water abstraction). • There is a trade-off between the short-term likelihood of reaching an agreement (which is increased when authoritarian governments can ignore potential domestic veto players) and the long-term success and sustainability of river development (which is enhanced when domestic stakeholders can contribute their views and capacities to the policy process). The assessment of this trade-off varies with different utility functions applied by different actors that attribute varying priorities to national economic growth, pro-poor services, or environmental conservation. • The costs and benefits of joint water development projects must be assessed in the context of the overall gains from improved international relations. In this sense, even joint river development projects that are locally damaging and unsustainable may catalyze the generation of substantial benefits ‘beyond the river’, e.g., through enhanced economic integration and trade relations. It is not a priori clear, therefore, whether cooperative ‘fast-track’ projects and agreements pushed through by authoritarian governments and based on domestically contested projects might not, at the end of the day, yield higher overall benefits than a perfectly integrated joint planning process that is constantly delayed due to the interference of domestic veto players in the negotiating states. ‘No regret’ projects, i.e., projects that generate 220
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Samuel Luzi Double
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Acknowledgment T his study was cond
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Acknowledgement Furthermore, I am g
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Table of Contents List of Figures 1
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Table of Contents 4.8 Patterns of p
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List of Figures 1.1 Converging anal
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List of Abbreviations AAU ADB ADLI
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List of Abbreviations R&D Research
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1 Introduction T he growing global
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Introduction 1.1 Research questions
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Introduction The analytical perspec
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Introduction concepts with regard t
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Introduction and Ashton 2004). Gene
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Introduction Causes, characteristic
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Introduction different tracks: 1) i
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Introduction management agreements
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Introduction While most of these st
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Introduction is defined as a state
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Introduction a) Country B Country A
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Introduction particularly stress th
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Introduction The notion of policy n
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Introduction studies. A short compa
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Introduction Closely related minist
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Introduction 1.6 Outline of the the
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3 International River Basins: Manag
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4 Driving forces and patterns of wa
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5 Shaky ground: Ethiopian water pol
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Appendix MOWR Department of Rural W
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Appendix 2 Meetings With which of t
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation 5A
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Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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