Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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Domestic Constraints and International Cooperation in the Eastern Nile Basin • Several infrastructure projects have been launched in recent years, either jointly approved through the ENSAP (e.g., the new irrigation projects in the Ethiopian Abbay basin or in Egypt’s West Delta region), or at least tacitly accepted (e.g., the Tekeze and Merowe dams in Ethiopia and the Sudan, respectively). However, these projects are often advertised domestically as ‘national’ rather than ‘cooperative’ achievements. In fact, most of these projects were designed in purely domestic planning processes and later re-labeled ‘NBI projects’. • Transboundary trade agreements, as examplified by the recent deal on meat export from Ethiopia to Egypt, are encouraging ‘spin-offs’ from improved transboundary relations that are partly based on the success of the NBI. Nevertheless, the potential to engage the people of the Nile countries in their capacity as producers, traders, and members of the civil society is far from being fully exploited. Nine years after its establishment, the NBI is still viewed with considerable skepticism. Critics see the NBI as a secretive, top-down technocratic venture, merely concerned with the joint exploitation of the river to increase national supply rather than with protection of the shared resources (Al-Ahram Weekly 2004; Pottinger 2004). As illustrated in this study, however, the limited success of the NBI in fostering the adoption of an integrated and sustainable river basin development framework can be at least partly attributed to political and institutional constraints at the domestic level, rather than to an inadequate design of the NBI itself or a lack of commitment among the involved water managers. 205
<strong>Double</strong>-<strong>Edged</strong> <strong>Hydropolitics</strong> on the Nile 7.4 Discussion Given the complexity of the Nile Basin negotiations, the interactions between the domestic and international levels of water governance are likely to follow equally complex patterns. The transboundary negotiations in the Nile Basin aim to establish a new legal and institutional framework, to initiate joint ‘win-win’ projects, and – in the longer term – to foster the harmonization of domestic water policies in order to exploit comparative advantages. Domestic constraints on all these issues collectively affect the national win-sets, and thus the outcomes of the overall negotiation process. Several paradigmatic trends in the field of water governance influence the course of cooperation in the Nile Basin. Domestic political reforms that empower the legislature and decentralized water user groups relative to the central government may reduce the chief negotiators’ room for maneuver in the Nile Basin negotiations and favor cooperative approaches that accommodate the interests of a broader range of domestic stakeholders. The adoption of national policies giving greater attention to issues of economic growth encourages the formulation of water sector strategies that aim at a higher water use efficiency at different levels, particularly also through the exploitation of comparative advantages at a basin scale. The growing influence of agroinvestors and polluting industries in the water policy processes (potentially increasing the pressure on the river), is balanced by the increasing prominence of environmental concerns and environmental actors in the water sector. The legal and institutional framework negotiations alone are unlikely to settle the issue of basin-wide water sharing due to the high uncertainties regarding the national short- and long-term water needs and the dominance in both countries of domestic actors perpetuating the claim for maximum national water shares. In part, this is the legacy of earlier threats of unilateral river development and the dogmatic approaches to the question of de jure national water quotas that have raised the ‘loss-of-face’ costs related to any concession to accommodate the interests of co-riparian states. Given the enormous domestic pressure, the Egyptian water authorities can hardly commit to a cooperative agreement that stipulates a reduction of Egypt’s water abstraction quota. Likewise, many influential Ethiopian actors and 206
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Samuel Luzi Double
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Acknowledgment T his study was cond
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Acknowledgement Furthermore, I am g
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Table of Contents List of Figures 1
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Table of Contents 4.8 Patterns of p
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List of Figures 1.1 Converging anal
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List of Abbreviations AAU ADB ADLI
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List of Abbreviations R&D Research
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1 Introduction T he growing global
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Introduction 1.1 Research questions
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Introduction The analytical perspec
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Introduction concepts with regard t
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Introduction and Ashton 2004). Gene
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Introduction Causes, characteristic
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Introduction different tracks: 1) i
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Introduction management agreements
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Introduction While most of these st
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Introduction is defined as a state
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Introduction a) Country B Country A
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Introduction particularly stress th
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Introduction The notion of policy n
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Introduction studies. A short compa
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Introduction Closely related minist
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Introduction 1.6 Outline of the the
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3 International River Basins: Manag
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International River Basins: Managem
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4 Driving forces and patterns of wa
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Driving forces and patterns of wate
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5 Shaky ground: Ethiopian water pol
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Shaky ground: Ethiopian water polic
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Appendix Questionnaires used in the
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Appendix • Please try to give you
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Appendix 2 Official Affiliation Wit
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation Wi
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Appendix Instructions All the follo
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Appendix MOWR Department of Rural W
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Appendix 2 Meetings With which of t
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation 5A
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Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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