Double-Edged Hydropolitics on the Nile - Center for Security Studies ...

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Concluding Remarks Table 8.1: Major domestic constraints to the national win-sets, i.e., the government’s ability to evaluate, adopt, and implement a broad spectrum of water policy options. The assigned scores indicate the extent to which a given constraint is present in a country, but not necessarily the comparative magnitude of its effect on the win-set. Domestic constraints Egypt Ethiopia Prominence of actors primarily interested in maximizing the de jure ++++ ++++ water share Divergence between the planning process and top-down national target-setting regarding water development and services provision +++ +++ Prominence of ‘food self-sufficiency’ as a policy imperative ++ +++ Prominence of actors advocating large-scale irrigation expansion +++ ++++ Stakeholder participation in governmental decision-making: decentralized authorities + +++ Stakeholder participation in governmental decision-making: advocacy groups Stakeholder participation in governmental decision-making: donor agencies + ++ ++ +++ Stakeholder resistance against irrigation expansion + + Local level stakeholder resistance against large-scale supply projects n.a. ++ Stakeholder resistance against demand management measures ++++ ++ Limited implementation capacity: large-scale supply projects (dams, diversions) n.a. +++ Limited implementation capacity: demand management measures +++ +++ Ineffective inter-ministerial policy coordination ++++ ++++ Ineffective information dissemination and communication +++ +++ Lack of innovative planning capacity due to limited stakeholder involvement ++++ ++++ Lack of innovative planning capacity due to limited research capacity + +++ The focus on domestic factors applied in this thesis does not negate the critical importance of ‘systemic’ determinants of success and failure regarding the transboundary cooperation in shared river basins. Geopolitical shifts such as the end of Cold War rivalries, the politico-economic developments at the global and regional levels, as well as the role of third-parties in the negotiation process are key explanatory variables in a comprehensive assessment of the current status of the transboundary relations in the Nile Basin. And yet, systemic variables alone can only explain and predict a part of the observed variance and dynamics of transboundary relations in shared river basins. 215
<strong>Double</strong>-<strong>Edged</strong> <strong>Hydropolitics</strong> on the Nile This thesis shows how the remaining variance of riparian state behavior can be approached by adopting a two-level game perspective, i.e., by laying a stronger focus on domestic level policy processes. Clearly, systemic and domestic factors contribute to complementary rather than competing explanations regarding the success and failure of transboundary negotiations in shared river basins. The degree to which systemic and domestic factors influence the course of transboundary conflict and cooperation is likely to vary from case to case as well. In the light of the empirical findings of this study and the theoretical considerations outlined in the introductory section and in the relevant chapters, the following conclusions regarding the interactions between domestic and international water policy processes in the Nile Basin can be drawn: • The domestic water policies in both countries are based to varying degrees on rational choice, organizational processes, and governmental politics patterns of policy-making. This limits the usefulness of conceptual approaches that frame the basin states’ negotiation positions solely in terms of a unified ‘national interest’. The riparian countries’ negotiation positions are a function of the interest divides among different domestic actors, and of the political institutions that determine the participation of these actors in the water policy process. Analytical frameworks designed to investigate the potential for conflict and cooperation in transboundary river basins should take this domestic dimension into account. • The lack of transboundary cooperation in the past and the persistent difficulties in reaching a cooperative agreement in the Nile Basin can partly be attributed to domestic-level constraints limiting the negotiators’ ability to commit to concessions in the question of de jure water re-allocation and in terms of far-reaching policy harmonization. For instance, domestic opposition against large-scale infrastructure development tends to limit the exploitation of hydraulic potentials, while constraints on demand management impede the convergence of national policies towards a more conservationist transboundary regime. • The tendency of the Eastern Nile states to prioritize infrastructure projects can be partly attributed to the limited extent of both inter- 216
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Samuel Luzi Double
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Acknowledgment T his study was cond
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Acknowledgement Furthermore, I am g
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Table of Contents List of Figures 1
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Table of Contents 4.8 Patterns of p
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List of Figures 1.1 Converging anal
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List of Abbreviations AAU ADB ADLI
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List of Abbreviations R&D Research
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1 Introduction T he growing global
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Introduction 1.1 Research questions
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Introduction The analytical perspec
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Introduction concepts with regard t
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Introduction and Ashton 2004). Gene
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Introduction Causes, characteristic
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Introduction different tracks: 1) i
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Introduction management agreements
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Introduction While most of these st
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Introduction is defined as a state
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Introduction a) Country B Country A
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Introduction particularly stress th
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Introduction The notion of policy n
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Introduction studies. A short compa
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Introduction Closely related minist
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Introduction 1.6 Outline of the the
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3 International River Basins: Manag
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5 Shaky ground: Ethiopian water pol
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation Wi
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Appendix Instructions All the follo
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Appendix MOWR Department of Rural W
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Appendix 2 Meetings With which of t
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Appendix 5 Effective cooperation 5A
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