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Despite the<br />
weaknesses the<br />
public <strong>sector</strong><br />
often displays<br />
as an equity<br />
investor<br />
(excessive<br />
caution <strong>and</strong><br />
sometimes redtape),<br />
these are<br />
not inherent,<br />
<strong>and</strong> are more<br />
often than not<br />
offset by the<br />
ability to bear<br />
higher risk<br />
Interestingly, <strong>and</strong> reassuringly, an earlier M-CRIL study based on nearly 250 MFIs rated since<br />
June 2005, found that extremely small MFIs with portfolios of less than 50 lakh had the<br />
highest CARs of all size classes - usually on account of accumulated donor grants (M-CRIL<br />
2005). Unfortunately these were being eroded by operating losses, a useful reminder that the<br />
main priority in assisting small <strong>and</strong> indeed most medium MFIs should be capacity building.<br />
However the fact that they have positive net worth makes the challenge of investing in them<br />
easier, accompanied by heavy doses of CB.<br />
Despite the weaknesses the public <strong>sector</strong> often displays as an equity investor (excessive<br />
caution <strong>and</strong> sometimes red-tape), these are not inherent <strong>and</strong> are more often than not offset<br />
by the ability to bear higher risk. It is true that at a time when the availability of equity<br />
financing was more of a constraint than it is now, SFMC did not find many takers for its equity<br />
offering, which took the form of cumulative redeemable preferable shares, <strong>and</strong> which were<br />
really quasi-equity or Tier II capital, of insufficient interest to most of the partners it was<br />
offered to. On the other h<strong>and</strong> its long term transformation loan, also a form of quasi-equity as<br />
subordinated debt, helped many partners in their transformation plans. 11<br />
MFDEF has shown similar risk-aversion (or at least bureaucratic delay) in formulating its guidelines<br />
(these are still interim) but has now started receiving <strong>and</strong> considering applications (of which<br />
is has received three). Appropriately, it is planning to limit the amount of investment per<br />
partner to Rs 2 crore for NBFCs, <strong>and</strong> Rs 1 crore for others, <strong>and</strong> to give preference mostly to<br />
MFIs in underserved states. For NGO-MFIs, whose structure does not provide for shareholder<br />
equity, MFDEF is planning to extend quasi-equity in the form of nine-year loans at 1 per cent,<br />
with a moratorium of two years.<br />
The "double-bottom line"<br />
The situation in<br />
India is a little<br />
more<br />
encouraging.<br />
Whatever their<br />
place on the<br />
commercialsocial<br />
continuum,<br />
there is strong<br />
dem<strong>and</strong> for the<br />
services of all<br />
the existing<br />
VCFs whether<br />
they focus<br />
primarily on<br />
investments<br />
with attractive<br />
returns or not<br />
A recent worldwide survey of foreign investment funds concluded that the average fund was<br />
too constrained in its ability to take risk 12 to add much value to the market, which was<br />
overcrowded. Very few of the funds were prepared "to finance less well-established MFIs,<br />
accept higher risk, spend greater amounts on pre-investment research <strong>and</strong> deliver funding in<br />
smaller packages" (CGAP 2005). The situation in India is a little more encouraging. Whatever<br />
their place on the commercial-social continuum, there is strong dem<strong>and</strong> for the services of all<br />
the existing VCFs whether they focus primarily on investments with attractive returns or not.<br />
This is because they all have in addition social goals (<strong>and</strong> therefore a "double bottom line"),<br />
<strong>and</strong> offer valuable CB inputs, whether through their own resources or by arrangement with<br />
institutions that have access to grant funding. Interestingly, in India, unlike the situation<br />
worldwide, most of the VC funding comes from private rather than public sources 13 <strong>and</strong> it is<br />
individuals <strong>and</strong> not public institutional investors who are behind the funds with the largest<br />
endowments of socially-motivated capital. Also, all the VCFs bear the foreign exchange risk<br />
themselves rather than pushing it on to the investee. Finally they are investing despite the<br />
lack of clear exit options. 14<br />
The dem<strong>and</strong> for equity<br />
The longer-term dem<strong>and</strong> for equity has been discussed above. The strong current dem<strong>and</strong> for<br />
equity comes from the spurt in NBFC start-ups, <strong>and</strong> from buy-outs of old pre-1999 NBFCs,<br />
especially in the urban areas. It also comes from a number of existing pre-1999 NBFCs, 15<br />
128