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Despite the<br />

weaknesses the<br />

public <strong>sector</strong><br />

often displays<br />

as an equity<br />

investor<br />

(excessive<br />

caution <strong>and</strong><br />

sometimes redtape),<br />

these are<br />

not inherent,<br />

<strong>and</strong> are more<br />

often than not<br />

offset by the<br />

ability to bear<br />

higher risk<br />

Interestingly, <strong>and</strong> reassuringly, an earlier M-CRIL study based on nearly 250 MFIs rated since<br />

June 2005, found that extremely small MFIs with portfolios of less than 50 lakh had the<br />

highest CARs of all size classes - usually on account of accumulated donor grants (M-CRIL<br />

2005). Unfortunately these were being eroded by operating losses, a useful reminder that the<br />

main priority in assisting small <strong>and</strong> indeed most medium MFIs should be capacity building.<br />

However the fact that they have positive net worth makes the challenge of investing in them<br />

easier, accompanied by heavy doses of CB.<br />

Despite the weaknesses the public <strong>sector</strong> often displays as an equity investor (excessive<br />

caution <strong>and</strong> sometimes red-tape), these are not inherent <strong>and</strong> are more often than not offset<br />

by the ability to bear higher risk. It is true that at a time when the availability of equity<br />

financing was more of a constraint than it is now, SFMC did not find many takers for its equity<br />

offering, which took the form of cumulative redeemable preferable shares, <strong>and</strong> which were<br />

really quasi-equity or Tier II capital, of insufficient interest to most of the partners it was<br />

offered to. On the other h<strong>and</strong> its long term transformation loan, also a form of quasi-equity as<br />

subordinated debt, helped many partners in their transformation plans. 11<br />

MFDEF has shown similar risk-aversion (or at least bureaucratic delay) in formulating its guidelines<br />

(these are still interim) but has now started receiving <strong>and</strong> considering applications (of which<br />

is has received three). Appropriately, it is planning to limit the amount of investment per<br />

partner to Rs 2 crore for NBFCs, <strong>and</strong> Rs 1 crore for others, <strong>and</strong> to give preference mostly to<br />

MFIs in underserved states. For NGO-MFIs, whose structure does not provide for shareholder<br />

equity, MFDEF is planning to extend quasi-equity in the form of nine-year loans at 1 per cent,<br />

with a moratorium of two years.<br />

The "double-bottom line"<br />

The situation in<br />

India is a little<br />

more<br />

encouraging.<br />

Whatever their<br />

place on the<br />

commercialsocial<br />

continuum,<br />

there is strong<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> for the<br />

services of all<br />

the existing<br />

VCFs whether<br />

they focus<br />

primarily on<br />

investments<br />

with attractive<br />

returns or not<br />

A recent worldwide survey of foreign investment funds concluded that the average fund was<br />

too constrained in its ability to take risk 12 to add much value to the market, which was<br />

overcrowded. Very few of the funds were prepared "to finance less well-established MFIs,<br />

accept higher risk, spend greater amounts on pre-investment research <strong>and</strong> deliver funding in<br />

smaller packages" (CGAP 2005). The situation in India is a little more encouraging. Whatever<br />

their place on the commercial-social continuum, there is strong dem<strong>and</strong> for the services of all<br />

the existing VCFs whether they focus primarily on investments with attractive returns or not.<br />

This is because they all have in addition social goals (<strong>and</strong> therefore a "double bottom line"),<br />

<strong>and</strong> offer valuable CB inputs, whether through their own resources or by arrangement with<br />

institutions that have access to grant funding. Interestingly, in India, unlike the situation<br />

worldwide, most of the VC funding comes from private rather than public sources 13 <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

individuals <strong>and</strong> not public institutional investors who are behind the funds with the largest<br />

endowments of socially-motivated capital. Also, all the VCFs bear the foreign exchange risk<br />

themselves rather than pushing it on to the investee. Finally they are investing despite the<br />

lack of clear exit options. 14<br />

The dem<strong>and</strong> for equity<br />

The longer-term dem<strong>and</strong> for equity has been discussed above. The strong current dem<strong>and</strong> for<br />

equity comes from the spurt in NBFC start-ups, <strong>and</strong> from buy-outs of old pre-1999 NBFCs,<br />

especially in the urban areas. It also comes from a number of existing pre-1999 NBFCs, 15<br />

128

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