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highest proportion of weak records (over half), <strong>and</strong> were half as likely as NGO or bank promoted<br />

groups to have good or moderate records. This is not surprising, since 77 percent of government<br />

promoted groups receive low inputs of any kind, microfinance or development, or field worker<br />

supervision, as compared with the average proportion for all groups, of 37 percent. 20<br />

An extremely<br />

useful finding is<br />

that it costs<br />

the equivalent<br />

of $115 to<br />

launch a group<br />

<strong>and</strong> another<br />

$145 to<br />

continue<br />

training <strong>and</strong><br />

monitoring it,<br />

for a total of<br />

$259 per group.<br />

This figure is<br />

about the modal<br />

cost of about Rs<br />

10,000 per<br />

group reported<br />

across a number<br />

of studies, <strong>and</strong><br />

imparts a sense<br />

of realism about<br />

the financial<br />

magnitude of<br />

the task ahead,<br />

which however<br />

is affordable as<br />

discussed below<br />

The level of overdues within groups has prudential implications not only for members' own<br />

savings, but is likely to be correlated with overdues from the groups to the banks, although<br />

this may have been masked so far because the relatively small size of the first couple of loans<br />

has enabled most groups to make bullet repayments at the end of the loan period. While this<br />

has the advantage of reducing transactions costs <strong>and</strong> may be more compatible with seasonality<br />

of cash flows, it could prove increasingly problematic as loan size increases. Although the<br />

norm is regular weekly or monthly payments, at least of interest, <strong>and</strong> often also of principal, in<br />

practice most SHPAs do not consider a loan to be overdue until repayment is 90 days overdue.<br />

On this definition 24 percent of current borrowers had overdues (<strong>and</strong> 5 percent of them were<br />

overdue by more than 12 months). Overdues were the highest for very poor borrowers, followed<br />

by those for the non-poor. 21<br />

Another measure of portfolio quality is portfolio at risk (PAR), which for the 45 percent of<br />

groups that had PARs of 365 days was 17 percent. 22 Overdues do not necessarily lead to<br />

default, <strong>and</strong> largely reflect considerable variance in practice with the stated norm of regular<br />

monthly or quarterly repayments, but default was found to be the most important reason for<br />

groups breaking up or ceasing to function (small though their number is), <strong>and</strong> overdues<br />

reduce the availability of funds for relending within the group <strong>and</strong> timely repayments to the<br />

banks. They also reduce profitability. 23 The study also found indications of an increasing<br />

number of groups reaching the limits of their credit absorption capacity, or the emergence of<br />

a sort of Peter's Principle, with groups rising to a level of loan size which they find difficult to<br />

absorb or repay, <strong>and</strong> of older groups being more likely to default. Viewed in this context, the<br />

impatience sometimes expressed with the rate <strong>and</strong> progression in size of repeat loans by the<br />

banks may be misplaced. In fact the evidence points to the need for consolidation of quality<br />

in its many aspects, <strong>and</strong> considerably diluting if not ab<strong>and</strong>oning the present focus on targets.<br />

Value for Money<br />

Another 2005 study "Do Self-Help Groups provide value for money" by LB Prakash <strong>and</strong> Others<br />

(Forthcoming), of 150 SHGs, 30 in each of 5 states, in each of which they were promoted by<br />

an SHPA of different institutional type, comes out with a similarly mixed verdict, <strong>and</strong> remarkably<br />

similar findings on (i) equity in loan distribution within groups (ii) dropouts (15 percent of<br />

members for the sample groups with had an average age of 5 years, but who were replaced by<br />

new members to the extent of 9 percent) (iii) longevity (lower for government promoted<br />

groups), <strong>and</strong> (iv) deteriorating portfolio quality with age (but better than in LSS with the<br />

365 day PAR being 11 percent). It found evidence also of a correlation between PARs within<br />

groups <strong>and</strong> in relation to loans outst<strong>and</strong>ing to the banks. 24<br />

Like many other studies it noted empowerment benefits, <strong>and</strong> increases in income (but for only<br />

25 percent of the members), <strong>and</strong> the decline of moneylenders who either "disappeared" or<br />

reduced their rates. Interestingly it did not find evidence of the NGOs in its sample having<br />

better portfolio quality, deeper outreach or greater profitability. An extremely useful finding<br />

32

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