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their profitability after accounting for both loan losses <strong>and</strong> the promoting SHPA's costs (iii)<br />

the sustainability of SHPAs in being able to recover their costs on group promotion, (iv) the<br />

sustainability of federations in providing continuing support, <strong>and</strong> (v) the sustainabiliity<br />

(profitability) of the banks in undertaking SHG lending. We have already considered the<br />

evidence of our studies on (i) <strong>and</strong> (ii). Regarding (v), the jury is still out on the profitabilility<br />

of the banks at the current level of interest rates being charged. 35 The evidence on sustainability<br />

of federations has been discussed by Nair (2005). For the programme as a whole, the<br />

sustainability of relevance is not financial but social <strong>and</strong> economic (in the cost-benefit<br />

sense). There is little doubt in the mind of well-informed observers who have field experience<br />

that the programme is vastly profitable in a social sense, even after including the cost of<br />

promotion that will have to be met by subsidies. Proving this is another matter given the<br />

unquantifiable nature of many of the benefits such as empowerment, <strong>and</strong> equity in access to<br />

finance. A third benefit, the reduction of income poverty is measurable, but much more<br />

rigorous studies than have been done so far will be necessary before it can be measured. 36<br />

One of the<br />

criticisms of<br />

the programme<br />

is that the level<br />

of support it<br />

provides to<br />

SHPAs is well<br />

below this, <strong>and</strong><br />

insufficient in<br />

amount <strong>and</strong><br />

time to build<br />

the capacity,<br />

primarily<br />

bookkeeping<br />

systems <strong>and</strong><br />

skills, required<br />

Regarding (iii), the modal estimate of SHG formation, training, <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>-holding costs over<br />

a period of time is about Rs 10,000, as noted earlier. One of the criticisms of the programme<br />

is that the level of support it provides to SHPAs is well below this, <strong>and</strong> insufficient in amount<br />

<strong>and</strong> time to build the capacity, primarily book-keeping systems <strong>and</strong> skills, required to (i)<br />

achieve the flexibility that would allow greater inclusion <strong>and</strong> depth of outreach, apart from<br />

(ii) greater transparency <strong>and</strong> accountability, both of which contribute to the social <strong>and</strong><br />

financial objectives of equity, longevity, <strong>and</strong> portfolio quality (<strong>and</strong> therefore profitability).<br />

However NABARD takes the view that grant assistance to NGOs for SHG promotion is not<br />

intended to meet the full costs of successful group promotion, but is only an add-on, which<br />

the NGO is expected to supplement from other sources including donors, <strong>and</strong> cross-subsidization<br />

from funding available for the other activities they often promote. In April 2005, NABARD<br />

increased the amount of grant assistance it pays an NGO for successful group promotion from<br />

Rs 2,000 to Rs 3,000 per group, <strong>and</strong> by 50 percent for all other SHPAs, including Regional<br />

Rural Banks (RRBs) which now receive Rs 1,000. The higher amount to NGOs is now released<br />

over 3 instead of 2 years, with a higher proportion of the amount "back-ended", <strong>and</strong> made<br />

conditional on maintenance of books of accounts, which have been audited by the NGO. 37<br />

Had the problem been entirely one of funding it would have been relatively tractable. It<br />

should be possible for the government to come up with the funds to pay for the full costs of<br />

SHG promotion. Assuming the programme exp<strong>and</strong>s organically at half a million new groups a<br />

year at a promotional cost of Rs 10,000 over the life of the groups, this translates to Rs 500<br />

crore, which is not very much more than the average of about Rs 400 crore a year as subsidies<br />

that were spent by the central government alone on the SGSY programme during the 10th<br />

Plan, on a small sub-set of the total number of groups that were included in the SGSY programme,<br />

largely ineffectively <strong>and</strong> wastefully. Since the states are expected to match the central<br />

government contribution with a matching 25 percent, the actual expenditure on credit linked<br />

subsidies was higher than Rs 500 crores. 38 The corpus of NABARD's Micro Finance <strong>Development</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Equity Fund (MFDEF) was doubled to Rs 200 crores in 2005, <strong>and</strong> amounts spent out of<br />

this on a pilot programme to find out what (<strong>and</strong> how long) it takes to create high quality<br />

groups that fulfill the criteria of an "ideal SHG" should be high priority. For the problem is as<br />

much one of the lack of a model or models, of the best way to go about equipping groups with<br />

the relevant skills <strong>and</strong> capacity, as discussed below.<br />

34

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