The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
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doubts about the verifiability and permanence <strong>of</strong> carbon <strong>of</strong>fsets in developing countries,<br />
environmental groups may also prefer to restrict <strong>of</strong>fsets to domestic sources, which may be seen<br />
as more easily verified.<br />
Challenges to REDD payments<br />
<strong>The</strong>re are many challenges to the effective use <strong>of</strong> REDD payments to mitigate climate change<br />
and benefit countries and poor people in SSA. <strong>The</strong>re will be serious technical difficulties and<br />
costs <strong>of</strong> defining baselines and measuring and verifying reduced de<strong>for</strong>estation and <strong>for</strong>est<br />
degradation. Measurement <strong>of</strong> changes in <strong>for</strong>est degradation, as opposed to de<strong>for</strong>estation (which<br />
can be measured using remote sensing techniques), is likely to be especially difficult.<br />
A particularly thorny problem is the issue <strong>of</strong> additionality, which hinges on the question<br />
<strong>of</strong> what level <strong>of</strong> de<strong>for</strong>estation would have occurred without the payments. Addressing this issue<br />
is important not only to assure the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the payments in reducing GHG emissions, but<br />
also because this determines the level <strong>of</strong> payments to be made. If a country with a high rate <strong>of</strong><br />
past de<strong>for</strong>estation is paid to reduce future de<strong>for</strong>estation rates below that level, large payments<br />
could be paid even though no actual reduction in emissions occurred as a result, if the rate <strong>of</strong><br />
de<strong>for</strong>estation would have declined anyway (<strong>for</strong> example, because <strong>of</strong> a halt in road building in<br />
<strong>for</strong>ested areas that was planned even without the payments). <strong>The</strong> hypothetical nature <strong>of</strong> the<br />
counterfactual situation (what would de<strong>for</strong>estation have been without the payments) may make<br />
REDD payments seem to be arbitrary and ineffective to many observers.<br />
A related issue is the potential <strong>for</strong> adverse incentives to be caused by REDD payments.<br />
If payments are made based on changes relative to current or recent de<strong>for</strong>estation rates (at the<br />
time <strong>of</strong> treaty implementation), this could create incentives <strong>for</strong> countries to promote or allow<br />
increased de<strong>for</strong>estation until the post-Kyoto treaty is ratified and begins to be implemented. This<br />
problem could be addressed by advocating and using a historical baseline that is be<strong>for</strong>e the<br />
current date, so that decisions related to de<strong>for</strong>estation made from now until the new treaty begins<br />
implementation could not affect future REDD payments. However, the longer the time period<br />
between the historical reference period and whenever the future treaty begins to be implemented,<br />
the less likely it is that the reference period will adequately represent what future de<strong>for</strong>estation<br />
would have been without the payments, especially in rapidly developing (or economically<br />
declining) countries. This problem could be addressed to some extent by predicting future<br />
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