The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
The Role of Sustainable Land Management for Climate ... - CAADP
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<strong>of</strong> CO 2 e reduction in the EU ETS or CDM). <strong>The</strong> first two options have the advantage <strong>of</strong> limiting<br />
the potential negative impacts <strong>of</strong> REDD payments on other carbon markets, but will greatly<br />
reduce the total amount <strong>of</strong> potential payments. <strong>The</strong> last option could maintain a large market <strong>for</strong><br />
REDD emissions reductions, albeit at an arbitrarily set discount, and would reduce but not<br />
eliminate the risk to other carbon markets. A sequence <strong>of</strong> the first and third options could also<br />
be used, with the first (segmented market) option used to allow price discovery in the REDD<br />
market, which could be used to establish a market-based discount factor to apply in the third<br />
option. Alternatively, the price <strong>for</strong> REDD payments in voluntary markets, where trades based on<br />
REDD projects are allowed, could be used to establish a discount factor.<br />
Challenges to payments <strong>for</strong> AFOLU activities<br />
Incorporating payments <strong>for</strong> AFOLU activities such as conservation tillage, agr<strong>of</strong>orestry, and<br />
rangeland management into a post-Kyoto regime and successfully reaching small scale farmers<br />
in SSA would also face many challenges and constraints. <strong>The</strong> transactions costs <strong>of</strong> establishing<br />
projects, monitoring and verifying emissions reductions could be prohibitive relative to the<br />
potential payments that farmers might receive. For example, consider the range <strong>of</strong> emissions<br />
reductions credit <strong>of</strong>fered by the CCX <strong>for</strong> conservation tillage (0.5 to 1.5 t CO 2 e per hectare) and<br />
a carbon price <strong>of</strong> $5 to $10 per t CO 2 e. With this range <strong>of</strong> credits and price <strong>of</strong> carbon, farmers<br />
could earn between $2.50 and $15 per hectare <strong>for</strong> adopting conservation tillage. This may well<br />
be worth it in terms <strong>of</strong> the farmers’ opportunity costs, since in many cases conservation tillage is<br />
more pr<strong>of</strong>itable than conventional tillage. Nevertheless, the transaction costs <strong>of</strong> participating in a<br />
payment scheme could easily swamp the value <strong>of</strong> the payment, especially <strong>for</strong> small farmers with<br />
only a few hectares <strong>of</strong> land.<br />
For small farmers in Africa (and elsewhere) to benefit substantially from AFOLU<br />
payments, the transaction costs per farmer must be very small. This means that expensive<br />
measurements <strong>for</strong> verification, such as soil and biomass samples to measure carbon sequestration<br />
levels on individual farms, are not likely to be feasible. A less costly approach, if measurement<br />
is desired, would be to have community or farmer organizations participate in a payment scheme,<br />
and use a sampling approach within these organizations to measure and verify carbon<br />
sequestration. Even less costly would be to establish norms <strong>for</strong> soil carbon sequestration<br />
achieved by particular types <strong>of</strong> land management practices, such as used by the CCX and the<br />
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